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I.

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The growth of the gestational surrogacy industry in the last few decades has raised concerns about the
human rights of the parties involved. Partly due to those concerns, several of the countries where
surrogacy was once widespread have recently prohibited the practice. Yet the human rights implications
of surrogacy are highly complex, and it is far from clear that a global surrogacy prohibition is the best or
even most feasible way to address rights concerns. This report aims to advance an understanding of the
human rights impact of laws, policies and practices around surrogacy. The report considers the practice
of surrogacy at a global level, as well as in the domestic country context, using Cambodia as a case study.
An examination of the intersections between women’s rights, gender equality, and the rights of children
and intended parent(s) reveals both the ways that surrogacy can protect and promote the rights of those
involved in the practice, as well as the ways that surrogacy can threaten the rights of those same parties.
The report was produced by a team of four students and two faculty members (hereafter ‘the authors’)
in the International Human Rights Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School and was submitted to the
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in order to contribute to ongoing work on human rights and global surrogacy during the 2018-2019 academic year. It combines desk
research, interviews, and in-country fact-finding. Desk research was conducted over the course of five
months (October, November and December 2018, and January and February 2019) and aimed at gaining
a holistic understanding of surrogacy practices and their implications. Research areas included the medical
and technological process, applicable international and regional human rights principles, comparative
domestic surrogacy legislation, academic and interest groups perspectives, harmful practices, surrogacy
intermediaries, geopolitical dynamics, and country-specific contexts, especially in Cambodia. To provide
a foundation for fact-finding, the authors conducted an initial set of interviews in the United States during
early 2019. Interviewed stakeholders included a surrogate, intended parent(s), a surrogacy lawyer and a
former public health official. Between March 20 and March 30, 2019, the authors then visited Cambodia,
with assistance from OHCHR in Cambodia, to conduct in-country fact-finding. The authors interviewed
various stakeholders including three surrogates, high-level public officials at the Cambodian Ministry of
Justice, Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the National Committee for Counter Trafficking, investigative
judges, a scholar, and representatives of non-governmental organizations in the fields of countertrafficking and public health. The identity of most of the interviewees remains confidential for security
reasons, but all interview notes are on file with the authors. This research, along with the foundational
desk research, has been consolidated in this report.
Though the report sets forth a comprehensive rights framework for surrogacy, it pays special attention to
the rights of surrogate women, a presently underdeveloped focus in existing literature, while placing less
emphasis on an investigation of the risks of child exploitation in surrogacy, which authors found has been
discussed with greater depth among commentators. Notably, authors did not find any documented
instances where surrogacy resulted in the abuse of any child. Authors did receive first-hand information
of one instance in which a child was exchanged for compensation by the child’s biological parents outside
the surrogacy context. In addition, authors concluded that the risks of child exploitation in the surrogacy
context are similar, if not less than, the risks present in other contexts, provided adequate screening
5

mechanisms are implemented. However, authors are not experts on the reality of child exploitation;
historical abuses that may offer insights for the surrogacy context, as well as the mechanisms through
which illicit enterprises traffic or exploit children today, were not thoroughly studied for the purposes of
this report. As a result, while authors caution against alarmism regarding child exploitation through
surrogacy, this report should not be viewed as conclusively suggesting that such concerns are without
merit. Rather, this report concludes from its limited research that child exploitation can likely be
prevented by regulatory protections, but suggests that further research be conducted into the risks of
child exploitation and the degree of legal protection necessary to eliminate those risks.
The report begins with background on the practice of surrogacy. It defines surrogacy and gives an
overview of the process and its history, and summarizes both the empirical research and the theoretical
debates surrounding the practice. Next, the report discusses the various human rights implicated by
surrogacy and established by international law. These include women’s rights such as reproductive
freedom, bodily autonomy, and the right to just and favorable working conditions; children’s rights,
including the right to an identity and the right to have their best interests promoted; and the rights of
individuals and couples to found families. International law prohibitions, such as the prohibition on forced
labor and human trafficking, are also relevant. This holistic assessment of the rights involved in surrogacy
ultimately reveals that human rights law can promote or protect the rights of all parties involved.
Accordingly, surrogacy ought to be permitted to the extent possible, though it may also be restricted as
necessary to protect conflicting rights.
To better inform these conclusions, the report uses a case study of surrogacy in Cambodia, which was
briefly a popular surrogacy destination before the government banned the practice in 2016. This case
study took place in March of 2019, when students and faculty from the International Human Rights Clinic
conducted interviews with various stakeholders, including government officials, nonprofit organizations,
and former surrogates. These in-depth discussions of the practice of surrogacy in Cambodia are included
in the report. They illustrate the importance of assessing surrogacy in its political and social context, and
offer a number of insights as to what sorts of factors might be relevant in determining how to regulate
surrogacy in a given country.
Using insights from the Cambodian case study, the report then considers the best legal approaches to
surrogacy. It stresses the importance of contextualizing surrogacy by weighing its risks against both the
benefits of surrogacy and the costs that might arise from surrogacy prohibition. It also considers various
contextual factors that should inform a regulatory approach to surrogacy, including a country’s existing
legal framework, institutional capacity, and health care system. This contextual assessment suggests that
in extreme cases, a ban on surrogacy may be justifiable, but under most circumstances, including in
Cambodia, human right concerns do not justify prohibition of surrogacy as long as regulations and
protections are in place to minimize the risks associated with the process. Moreover, to adequately
protect reproductive and other human rights, surrogacy regulation should be implemented in light of a
holistic view of the country’s laws and circumstances, including its existing ART laws.
The report concludes by summarizing the policy recommendations that follow from the report’s analysis,
including the minimum protections that must be implemented to ensure a rights-protective surrogacy
6

industry, as well as some initial thoughts on how both individual countries and the international
community can effectively implement those protections. Surrogacy ought to be regulated in order to
prevent various rights abuses that can and have occurred in the surrogacy context. Children have been
left orphaned or stateless by conflicting legal systems, and surrogate women have been subject to poor
medical treatment, unfair contract terms, and infringements on their autonomy. On the other hand,
surrogacy has provided new possibilities for many individuals and couples wishing to found a family as
well as a new economic opportunity for some women with otherwise limited financial opportunities.
Policy approaches to surrogacy should therefore consider regulatory options that provide effective
protections for all parties, especially women and children, against abuses without unnecessarily restricting
women’s reproductive freedom and the promise this scientific advancement provides to many.

II.

OVERVIEW OF SURROGACY
A.

BACKGROUND

Surrogacy is an arrangement in which a woman agrees to become pregnant and give birth in order to
provide a child to a third party, who agrees to act as the parent. 1 Surrogacy is currently legal in ten
countries, banned in approximately ten, and unregulated in the remainder.2 Over the last few decades,
the surrogacy industry has expanded, as more individuals and couples previously unable to reproduce
pursue the possibility of having biological children through the practice of surrogacy. Because countries
do not consistently record surrogate births separately from other births, there is no reliable global data
on the number of annual surrogate births.3
Advances in reproductive medical technology in the last fifty-years have made surrogacy possible. In 1953,
doctors carried out the first successful human pregnancy using frozen spermatozoa 4 which made
traditional surrogacy possible. Traditional surrogacy5 involves implantation of the egg of a surrogate with
the sperm of an intended6 or donor parent usually through the process of artificial insemination.7 Thus,
children born through traditional surrogacy may or may not be genetically related to their intended
parent(s) but are always related to the surrogate.8
Since the 1950s, the surrogacy process has advanced due to two key scientific developments. In 1978, the
first documented case of successful in vitro fertilization (IVF) was reported, a process by which an egg is
fertilized in a laboratory and then implanted into a women’s uterus.9 Then, in 1986, the first frozen egg
resulted in a viable pregnancy. 10 These two developments made another form of surrogacy possible:
gestational surrogacy. Gestational surrogacy uses IVF to fertilize a third-party egg with the sperm of a
third-party donor, or intended parent. 11 The embryo from a donated oocyte and sperm, or from the
intended parent(s), is transferred to the surrogate’s uterus, resulting in the development of a fetus, which
may have no genetic relationship to the surrogate.12 Depending on whether the intended third-party is
(1) an individual or couple, and (2) if a couple, whether both sperm and egg were donated by the intended
parent(s), zero, fifty, or one hundred percent of the DNA of a child born through surrogacy may be genetic
material from the intended parent(s). Today, gestational surrogacy is far more common than traditional
surrogacy.
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B.

SURROGACY PRACTICES AND ARRANGEMENTS

This section provides a broad overview of the surrogacy process, but it is important to recognize that the
way surrogacy is practiced varies greatly in different contexts; depending on the context, different human
rights concerns may arise, and diverse policy approaches may be needed. 13 In addition, because the
surrogacy industry is fairly new, and much of surrogacy has occurred in an unregulated market or in
contravention of surrogacy laws, there is limited data on how surrogacy has been practiced so far. Much
of the information relied on for this report comes from India and the United States, where surrogacy has
been studied in some depth, and from the case study conducted in Cambodia. As a result, the following
description will not apply uniformly to all surrogacy arrangements, but it should nonetheless be helpful in
outlining the basic process.
The surrogacy process involves a surrogate, intended parent(s), and medical professionals who perform
and monitor the necessary procedures. Other parties may also be involved, including sperm and egg donor
banks, intermediary agencies and legal counsel.14 These entities may be integrated15 or services provided
separately. 16 Typically, a surrogacy arrangement begins with an individual or couple, referred to as
intended parent(s), who seek to conceive and raise a child but are unable to do so without assisted
reproductive technology (ART). Most intended parent(s) hire an intermediary agency to identify an
appropriate surrogate to provide the service of carrying and birthing the child. 17 There are two primary
forms of arrangements -- altruistic and commercial. In altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate receives no
compensation from the intended parent(s) for the service, but is reimbursed for costs and expenses.18
Reimbursed expenses can include lost-wages, medical expenses and other costs incurred. In commercial
surrogacy, the surrogate is also compensated for her labor, including the labor of becoming pregnant,
carrying the fetus, and giving birth to child, as well as the after-effects of the pregnancy.19 In Australia, for
instance, typical costs for altruistic surrogacy can range from AUD 15,000 to over 100,000 (about USD
10,000 to 70,000), depending on the medical expenses. 20 In the United Kingdom, costs of altruistic
surrogacy reportedly range from GBP 10,000 to 60,000 (about USD 13,000 to 77,000). 21 On average,
altruistic surrogates in the UK are compensated GBP 15,000 (about USD 19,000).22 The cost of commercial
surrogacy varies widely, depending on the fees allocated to the surrogate and the cost of medical and
other expenses per country. In the United States, such fees can range from about USD 60,000 to
150,000.23
Intermediary agencies can serve an important role in matching the surrogate and intended parent and
ensuring a proper process and arrangement. However, these agencies are currently operating in many
jurisdictions with little regulation and oversight. Abuse and negligence have been reported, especially
among agencies located in jurisdictions with few legal regulations.24 While the more reputable agencies
tend to choose to operate in environments with legal regulation, there are still concerns about the
absence of standards and requirements for these agencies.25 An American surrogacy lawyer interviewed
by the authors reported cases of mismanaged agencies and even swindling of surrogates and intended
parent(s).26
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To date, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, the UK, and Australia have legalized and regulated some forms
of altruistic surrogacy. 27 The United States, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Israel have legalized and
regulated both altruistic and commercial surrogacy.28 For some of these countries, surrogacy is regulated
internally at the state or provincial level. 29 Countries that have banned surrogacy entirely include
Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain.30 Unregulated countries include a majority of the
countries in Latin America and Africa.31
Countries that have legalized and regulated the surrogacy process tend to specify minimal terms of the
agreement and impose requirements on the surrogate and intended parent(s).32 For example, surrogates
may be required to satisfy a number of prerequisites before being matched with intended parent(s).33
Common requirements are that surrogates be in a certain age bracket, neither smoke nor abuse alcohol,34
have previously delivered at least one child without health complications,35 and pass certain physical and
mental health evaluations. 36 Requirements may also be imposed on intended parent(s); common
examples include a minimum age,37 being married,38 contributing at least one gamete to the child,39 being
unable to give birth to a child themselves,40 and satisfying medical and psychological evaluations.41
Jurisdictions that have extensive regulations on surrogacy usually require a written agreement, often a
legally enforceable contract, between the surrogate and intended parent(s). 42 Some jurisdictions also
require certain terms in the written agreement. 43 These written agreements will generally include
provisions about the rights and duties of the parties, 44 and in particular, the allocation of financial
responsibility for the surrogate’s medical expenses,45 the allocation of decision-making power in case of
pre-birth diagnosis and abortion,46 and restrictions on the surrogate’s conduct during the pregnancy.47
For instance, the American surrogate interviewed by the authors reported that her contract provided that
she would have the final say in pregnancy-related decisions if they implicated her health or life, but that
the intended parent(s) would otherwise make decisions related to the pregnancy;48 it also provided that
the intended parent(s) would be liable for all medical expenses, including potential complications and
post-natal care.49
Depending on the jurisdiction, the parties may engage a legal representative to assist in setting and
enforcing the terms of the agreement. In some jurisdictions, surrogates and intended parent(s) engage
independent legal counsel while, in others, shared counsel. 50 In addition, in the most protective
jurisdictions, agreements have to be validated by courts before medical procedures can start.51
In jurisdictions that lack substantial regulation, however, terms and conditions of the arrangements vary
widely. For example, in some, the parties may never meet; all agreements are made with the intermediary
agency.52 The surrogates interviewed by the authors in Cambodia were approached and cared for by
intermediaries, but never met the intended parent(s) before the birth of the child. 53 In some cases,
surrogates are never provided with written terms of their agreement. This was also the case for the
surrogates interviewed by the authors in Cambodia: at the outset, they were simply given information
about the amount of money they would receive and the fact that they would have to be pregnant and
give away the child; later on, other surrogates told them more about the process.54 But they did not
negotiate or sign a formal contract or receive advice or legal counsel.55
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Despite variations in agreements, the surrogacy process generally involves either (1) use of sperm and egg
donor banks or (2) use of the IVF process to extract genetic material from the intended parent(s).56 The
surrogate is then implanted with the resulting embryo. 57 Throughout the process, the surrogate is
expected to undergo a series of medical tests, take medication to support development of the fetus and
is subject to restrictions on her movement and practices. In countries such as India, Thailand, and
Cambodia, surrogates are usually required to stay in particular locations or facilities, such as communal
homes run by surrogacy agencies.58 In some cases in India, surrogates were not allowed to leave the clinic
or hostel where they were kept except under special circumstances.59 One of the surrogates interviewed
by authors in Cambodia described living in a house with a group of surrogates during their pregnancy.60
Surrogates in other countries, including the United States, are not required to move to clinics during the
pregnancy. However, various state surrogacy laws within the United States allow gestational surrogacy
contracts to restrict the surrogate’s activities during pregnancy. For instance, it is typical for surrogacy
contracts to place limits on a surrogate’s travel outside of her state of residence after a certain number of
weeks into the pregnancy.61 The American surrogate interviewed by the authors stated that her contract
provided that after 25 weeks of pregnancy, she could not go further than 50 miles from the hospital she
would deliver at; she was also forbidden from flying after a certain week of pregnancy.62 State surrogacy
laws differ widely on these restrictions. Some states such as Illinois explicitly provide for “the gestational
surrogate’s agreement to abstain from any activities that the intended parent(s) or physician reasonably
believes to be harmful to the pregnancy and future health of the child.”63 However, other states outline
few restrictions. The surrogacy lawyer interviewed by the authors described these contractual restrictions
of surrogates’ conduct as necessary and important to make sure that they do not take unnecessary risks
during the pregnancy. 64 Some contracting parties may also see these restrictions as necessary given
significant differences between state laws.65 However, a policy maker interviewed expressed concern that
these restrictions unnecessarily impinged on the surrogate’s freedom of movement.66
Eventually, when she gives birth to the baby, the surrogate is obligated to give the baby to the intended
parent(s). Where surrogacy is regulated, a procedure is usually put into place for the intended parent(s)
to be registered as the legal parent(s) of the child on the birth certificate.67 One type of regulation provides
a procedure to establish the parentage before the birth of the child, in which case the intended parent(s)
are the legal parent(s) of the child immediately upon birth. 68 Another type of regulation requires a
validation of the surrogacy agreement pre-birth, then the filing of a notice once the child is born, the court
then confirms parentage of the intended parent(s).69 A third type of regulation establishes a procedure to
grant legal parenthood to the intended parent(s) only once the child is born.70 Under some regulations,
the procedure to obtain legal parenthood is administrative;71 under others, it involves a court order.72
These procedures usually require the intended parent(s) to show that the legal requirements for surrogacy
were respected.73
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C.

PERSPECTIVES ON ALTRUISTIC AND COMMERCIAL SURROGACY

The practice of surrogacy, both altruistic and commercial, has generated much debate. Some
commentators emphasize the potential benefits of surrogacy as providing important opportunities for
both intended parent(s) and surrogates. 74 Individuals and couples who are unable to have children
themselves are able to form families, while women seeking to improve their financial situations—
especially those with limited economic opportunities—are able to earn significant income as surrogates.75
On the other hand, many parties have objected to surrogacy. Some object to surrogacy in all forms, usually
for philosophical or religious reasons. Some argue that surrogacy inherently commodifies women or
children by reducing them to items bought and sold for money.76 Others argue that traditional procreation
is the only ethical way to conceive a child.77 Still others object to the use of embryos in all forms of assisted
reproduction.78
Scholars, analysts and policy makers who do not view surrogacy as inherently wrong have still expressed
concerns regarding surrogacy in practice. Some have expressed concerns that surrogacy creates too many
risks for children, including child trafficking or exploitation.79 Some believe that surrogacy exploits women
because of power imbalances between surrogates and other parties.80 Some have argued that the choice
to engage in surrogacy is never truly voluntary because people desperate for money will subject
themselves to anything if offered enough compensation. 81 Others worry that, even if women do
voluntarily become surrogates, other parties may abuse them by crafting unfair agreements or failing to
follow through with their obligations.82 These criticisms are sometimes limited to specific contexts. For
instance, those who object to commodification, or believe that compensation is what leads to
exploitation, may still support altruistic surrogacy.83 Those who fear exploitation may support domestic
surrogacy, or surrogacy in certain countries with strong legal protections.84
Supporters of surrogacy have, in turn, addressed many of these concerns. Academics have challenged
positions that surrogacy inherently commodifies women and children. In response to claims that
surrogacy involves selling a child; proponents of surrogacy have argued that the surrogate is providing a
service by carrying a child that belongs—and always has belonged—to the intended parent(s).85 Another
position, most famously advanced by the economist Richard Epstein, objects to the very premises of the
commodification argument. Epstein argues that allowing something to be exchanged on the market does
not inherently devalue or degrade the thing being sold; indeed, it may ensure that the thing being sold
goes to the party that values it the most.86 In the surrogacy context, this means that putting a price on the
service provided by surrogates does not degrade the value of their labor nor the value of the resulting
children.
Philosopher Martha Nussbaum also challenges the commodification criticism, claiming that people often
object to supposedly “degrading” forms of labor for reasons ultimately grounded in prejudices against
lower classes.87 To illustrate, she notes that people historically found opera singers objectionable because
they commodified their voices.88 Nussbaum also responds to concerns about exploitation, pointing out
that the risk of exploitation arises not from the legalization of practices like surrogacy, but rather from the
power imbalances that exist in a society generally.89 In other words, vulnerable women who engage in
11

surrogacy may be at risk of exploitation, but they would also be at risk of exploitation if they pursued any
other form of work. The solution is therefore not to restrict particular practices, but rather to find ways
to empower society’s most vulnerable groups. Similar arguments have been made by other scholars as
well, who often emphasize the significant benefits of surrogacy to the very women supposedly being
exploited.90
Even those with serious concerns about the surrogacy industry often caution that banning surrogacy may
be even riskier. If surrogacy is prohibited, they argue, a completely unregulated, illegal market will
emerge, endangering children, women, and intended parent(s).91

D.

EMPIRICAL ACCOUNTS OF SURROGACY

Empirical research on surrogacy remains in its early stages, but evidence so far suggests that surrogacy,
when practiced under the right conditions, can be a positive experience for all parties involved. For
instance, doctors in the United Kingdom and the United States have studied surrogacy practices at clinics
and found high rates of successful births, low rates of
complications, and extremely rare incidents of ethical or legal
complications. 92 Some medical studies have found that
“Everybody is benefited
pregnancies using donor eggs—which would include any
gestational surrogacy—may involve greater health risks than by this, the doctors who
traditional pregnancies, though the research is still limited. 93
are involved, the couples
Psychologists from the University of Cambridge studied a group
of surrogates, children, and intended parent(s) for ten years who cannot have their
following the children’s births. They concluded that children and
own
children,
and
intended parent(s) were well adjusted and had healthy parentlike us who
child relationships, and that by age ten, children had positive women
attitudes about their surrogate births and their surrogate cannot earn enough to
mothers.94 The surrogates studied either reported no significant
feed our own children.”
emotional difficulties, or difficulties that subsided within a few
weeks.95 Other studies in the United Kingdom have echoed this
-Kavita, Indian Surrogate
finding, reporting positive experiences for both gestational and
96
traditional surrogates. A particularly comprehensive article by
Dr. Janice C. Ciccarelli and Professor Linda J. Beckman, two psychologists in California, synthesized various
psychological evidence on surrogacy and concluded that the results were generally positive.97 They note
that despite the preliminary nature of existing data, “the consistency of results is almost impressive,” and
add that “empirical data offer little support for widely expressed concerns” about emotional damage or
exploitation.98
At the same time, accounts of surrogacy in some contexts have revealed troubling practices, and individual
incidents have prompted concern. Much of this evidence comes from South or Southeast Asia, especially
India. India has a large surrogacy market and its surrogates tend to be poorer and less educated compared
to surrogates in Western Europe or the United States, arguably putting them at greater risk of
12

exploitation.99 Numerous reports on surrogates in India document lack of informed consent to surrogacy
procedures, finding that Indian surrogates often had little or no knowledge of the medical processes
involved or the terms of their contracts.100 Intermediaries in India and other countries have also failed to
provide adequate medical care in many cases. Surrogates often receive little or no postnatal care101 and,
in some cases, surrogates have experienced fatal medical complications.102 Surrogacy intermediaries have
coerced women into entering or continuing surrogacy arrangements, sometimes with financial threats.103
Reports also show that surrogacy contracts are usually strict and unfavorable to surrogates. Contracts
often provide relatively low compensation, limit surrogates’ ability to make medical decisions, and offer
little legal protection in the event of disputes or complications.104 Nonetheless, surrogates in India have
often reported that they were glad for the opportunity to become surrogates, 105 and many of them
benefited greatly from the money they received.106
Some of the issues surrounding surrogacy arise from inconsistent or non-transparent state laws, rather
than from the kind of poor surrogacy practices discussed above. For instance, there have been instances
where children born through international surrogacy were orphaned or left stateless. 107 Surrogate
children may be orphaned if the intended parent(s) abandon the child they commission in jurisdictions
where the intended parent(s) are recognized as the legal parents. 108 Statelessness may result when
neither the state of the surrogate mother nor that of the intended parent(s) grants nationality to the
surrogate child—usually because the surrogate’s state recognizes the intended parent(s) as legal
parent(s), while the intended parent(s)’ state does not.109 In cases brought before courts, the intended
parent(s)’ state has often allowed the children to enter the country and remain with the intended
parent(s), but in at least one case the child was put up for adoption.110 As described in the Cambodia case
study below, intended parent(s) have also been denied custody of the resulting child and the surrogate
required by the state to raise her or him.

E.

GLOBAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS

The market for surrogacy first developed in the United States, making it the first providing country.111 The
first baby successfully born through commercial surrogacy was born in 1985 in Michigan.112 By 1987, more
than twenty surrogacy agencies had opened within the United States, and today, there are more than one
hundred-fifty such agencies. 113 Most surrogates in the United States were non-Hispanic whites with
incomes likely between USD 15,000 and 30,000 a year.114 The price for surrogacy in the early 2000s was
approximately between USD 35,000 and 100,000, and has since increased to between USD 90,000 and
130,000.115 The United States continues to provide surrogacy to foreigners.116 The most frequent receiving
country is China.117
Other countries began to engage in commercial surrogacy in the early 2000s. In 2002, India legalized
commercial surrogacy and became the largest providing country.118 Surrogate labor was comparatively
less expensive in India than many other states, costing approximately USD 10,000–28,000, 119
approximately USD 2,000-8,000 of which was given to the surrogate. 120 As a result, much of the
international market demand moved to India.
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India significantly changed the global commercial surrogacy landscape. Increased demand for surrogates
in India raised concerns about exploitation particularly because Indian women were likely to be generally
poorer than American women, and therefore more vulnerable to exploitative practices, whether social,
legal, physical or emotional. 121 In 2012, to address concerns, India passed a series of restrictive
regulations, including visa guidelines that limited viable applicants to heterosexual couples who had been
married for a minimum of two years, and met the criteria for a medical, rather than tourist, visa. 122 In
2016, India banned transnational surrogacy altogether. Leading up to the ban, some expressed concerns
about the fate of surrogate children. For instance, in the widely publicized 2007 Baby Manji case, a
Japanese couple divorced just prior to the birth of their surrogate child by an Indian surrogate. Following
the divorce, the intended mother no longer wanted to raise the child, leaving the surrogate child without
clear parentage or nationality.123 The Indian government also expressed concerns about the well-being of
surrogate mothers. The government argued that commercial surrogacy exploited India’s working-class
women. 124 Headlines proclaimed that Indian women were “renting their wombs” and “pimping their
pregnancies,” and widely accused surrogates of producing children for wealthy foreigners, 125 though
Indian surrogates countered this narrative, emphasizing their relationships with the intended parent(s)
and their desire to help them start families.126
Around this same time, surrogacy emerged in other Southeast-Asian countries like Thailand, Cambodia,
Laos and Malaysia127 and became more prevalent after India passed restrictions in 2012. 128 As demand
for surrogates rose in these countries, their governments also issued restrictions or bans.129 Following a
famous incident called the Baby Gammy Case, Thailand passed the Protection for Children Born through
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act on July 30, 2015, which outlawed the previously unregulated
practice of transnational surrogacy in Thailand, but permitted it domestically.130 The Baby Gammy Case
involved a Thai surrogate who became pregnant with twins intended for Chinese parents. Upon learning
that one of the twins would be born with Down syndrome, the Chinese parents instructed the surrogate
to abort, however she chose to raise the child with Down syndrome herself, while the Chinese parents
raised the child without Down syndrome.131 The Baby Gammy case called international attention to some
of the legal problems that could arise from surrogacy arrangements. Thailand’s Act aimed to mitigate
these kinds of legal dilemmas by banning foreigners from contracting for surrogacy. The Act also banned
same-sex couples from hiring surrogates, however it permitted Thai couples, or individuals with a Thai
partner, who have been married for three years to hire surrogates in Thailand.132
In 2016, one year after Thailand placed restrictions on transnational surrogacy, Cambodia’s Ministries of
Health and Justice passed legislation limiting the practice as well. In some cases, local enforcement action
has backed the national position, however clear policies are still forming.133 In 2017, an Australian nurse
and two Cambodian assistants were arrested for illegally running a commercial surrogacy clinic, and thirtytwo Cambodian surrogates were detained and charged with human trafficking. The surrogates have since
been released, although they were freed on the condition that they raise the surrogate children
themselves. 134 As of 2018, all forms of surrogacy were banned in Cambodia, however no formal
regulations have been issued and the Cambodian government is still in the process of drafting legislation
that will provide clearer policies.135 Without formal legislation, the practice has continued illegally, with a
particularly large demand for surrogates coming from China. 136 Cross-border programs have also
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developed between Cambodia and countries like Laos and Malaysia. Since standard fertility treatments
are still permitted in Cambodia, embryos can be conceived in Cambodia and then sent to other countries
for use by surrogates.137
Though many South Asian countries have restricted or banned surrogacy, the practice remains prevalent
around the world, both in countries where there are stricter regulations, such as in the United States, and
in countries where there are very few regulations, such as countries in North Africa138 as well as Eastern
European countries like Ukraine, where there have also been recent reports of exploitation of
surrogates.139

III.

THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK

Children, surrogates, and intended parent(s), as well as states and intermediaries, have distinct and often
competing interests that must be considered and balanced when assessing the human rights implications
of the practice of surrogacy. There are currently no international legal instruments directly addressing
surrogacy. However, experts, judicial entities and interpretive treaty bodies have addressed the practice
of surrogacy and assisted reproductive technologies more generally within the context of the rights and
interests expressed under international law. Among the relevant treaties are the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD). These treaties address various rights relevant to the surrogate, including reproductive rights and
the right to fair working conditions, and various rights relevant to the child born through surrogacy,
including the best interest of the child principle and the right to an identity and nationality. Treaties also
address rights and interests relevant to intended parent(s) in the surrogacy process, such as the right to
found a family and to do so without discrimination.
The practice of surrogacy is recent as is its treatment under international law. It is unsurprising, therefore,
that there has been a difference of opinion on the manner in which it invokes or infringes upon
international human rights.140 This section addresses the human rights law implications of the practice of
surrogacy.
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As explained further below, the practice of surrogacy does not,
per se, violate existing international human rights law. In fact,
when implemented with proper protective mechanisms, When implemented with
surrogacy could enhance the rights of all stakeholders, and its proper protective mechanisms,
restriction may impermissibly limit women’s reproductive rights surrogacy could enhance the
and autonomy, rights women, in practice, often hold tenuously as rights of all stakeholders, and
it is. International standards require the protection of these rights its restriction may
regardless of social and economic context and so restriction of impermissibly limit women’s
these rights requires careful reflection. That said, in the absence
reproductive rights and
of protective mechanisms, or where structural and institutional
autonomy, rights women, in
barriers frustrate attempts at ensuring a rights-protective
practice, often hold tenuously
process, women, children, and intended parent(s) involved in
surrogacy may be at risk of other important rights violations. as it is.
These vulnerabilities are real but, as explored in the following
sections, many are not unique to surrogacy but caused by inadequate governance, various forms of social
inequalities and discrimination as well as a lack of social services and assistance. This section begins by
exploring the human rights implications for the various parties involved in the surrogacy process.

A.

SURROGACY AS A PER SE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
1.

SALE OF CHILDREN

International experts, government officials, academics and advocates around the world have raised the
concern that surrogacy may amount to the sale of children under international law. 141 Under the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the sale of children consists of “any act or transaction whereby a
child is transferred by any person or group of persons to another for remuneration or any other
consideration.”142 The sale of children is prohibited under Article 35 of the Convention as well as the
Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.143 Prohibited actions
include offering or accepting a child for exploitative purposes such as organ sale, sex work and forced
labor, as well as improperly inducing consent as an intermediary for the adoption of a child. 144 The
prohibition on the sale of children is concerned with the taking of children for “commercial or sexual
motive[s].”145 Article 35 was meant to act as a “fail-safe protection”, to protect children “from being
abducted or procured for financial gain, drug trafficking, sex trade, or other forms of exploitation.”146
The sale of children has long been a concern within the international community, especially in countries
where economic desperation is prevalent, though evidence of the extent of this practice has been
uneven.147 Still, sale of children has been documented and authors encountered evidence of one instance
of sale of children, outside the surrogacy context, during an interview conducted for this report in
Cambodia. 148 The prohibition is aimed at protecting children from exploitation and abuse, 149 and at
preventing parents from being coerced into selling their children.150
In the adoption context, for example, international law prohibits intermediaries and adopting parents
from giving money to families putting their child up for adoption.151 According to the foundational report
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prepared to inform the 1993 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, it was concerns over lack of informed consent on the part of biological parents,
failure to obtain consent of both parents, the use of coercion, lies, or duress to obtain the child, the use
of falsified documents in facilitating an adoption, and bribery in facilitating an adoption, that motivated
international action in the context of inter-country adoption.152 In Fornero and Daughter v. Argentina, for
example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found a violation of numerous human rights in a case
in which the father of a child did not give consent for the adoption and where the mother was allegedly
paid for giving consent to the adoption.153
In the context of surrogacy, some similar concerns that motivated the prohibition on the sale of children
exist, including concerns that surrogates could be coerced and a child exploited. However, surrogacy does
not by definition or in practice inherently involve the sale of children and evidence is absent to support
the conclusion that sale of children concerns are more acute for surrogacy practices. First, as many
commentators have noted, the surrogacy process does not itself amount to the sale of children in that it
does not exchange a child for money as defined by international law.154 The elements that constitute the
sale of a child are not present. In the context of altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate does not receive any
payment.155 And in the context of commercial surrogacy, the surrogate does not receive a payment in
exchange for the child, but rather for the service she provides by carrying the fetus in her womb.156 Legally,
in jurisdictions that allow for commercial surrogacy, there is usually no transfer of parentage from one
party to another, because the embryo is considered the intended parent(s)’s from the start. Medically,
the gestational surrogate has no genetic link to the embryo and thus is not “selling” her own biological
material or offspring.157

Policy concerns, in fact, counsel against this incorrect and overly
rigid framing of surrogacy as the sale of children.

Moreover, the policy concerns that motivated the ban on selling children are no more present in the
context of surrogacy than any other case where guardianship of a child is at issue. Because children are
not being traded for money, there is no risk that children or society will be harmed by the
“commodification” of children. Studies have found no adverse psychological effects on children born
through surrogacy, as discussed above, and though children born through surrogacy could theoretically
be exploited or abused, there is no evidence that surrogacy practices pose a greater risk than any other
process that leads to parenting. In fact, any evidence of dignitary harms to children in the process of
surrogacy is at best inconclusive.158
Policy concerns, in fact, counsel against this incorrect and overly rigid framing of surrogacy as the sale of
children. All available evidence indicates that surrogacy practices overwhelmingly are engaged in with the
intention by all parties of founding and growing families. Failing to recognize intended parent(s)’ role in
the creation of the child undermines the integrity of non-traditional families and the protected choices
involved in establishing one’s family. It also discriminates against same-sex couples and persons whose
infertility prevents them from fully enjoying related human rights.159 An understanding that surrogacy is
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not sale of children does not hamper states in any way from addressing circumstances of trafficking and
exploitation (discussed below). States can prevent abuse and exploitation of children born through
surrogacy by ensuring that intended parent(s) are properly screened and even creating monitoring
mechanisms to ensure the child’s well-being after birth, as in the adoption context.160
As set forth in the section that follows, other risk factors for abuse or exploitation, such as imbalance of
power between the surrogate and the intended parent(s) or intermediaries, can also be addressed
without the sale-of-children concern framing the analysis. There are, of course, numerous policy
interventions that can best ensure the process is implemented in a manner that serves the best interest
of the resulting child discussed in more detail below.

2.

TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

Restrictions or bans on the practice of surrogacy are often justified as a means of protecting vulnerable
women and children from the threat of human trafficking.161 Here, again, the practice of surrogacy does
not inherently constitute human trafficking. Human trafficking involves the procurement of an individual
for the purpose of forced labor and/or sexual exploitation and is prohibited by various human rights
instruments, including CEDAW and the 2002 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking Persons,
Especially Women and Children.162 The Protocol defines human trafficking by three components: an action
consisting in the recruitment, reception, transfer or harboring of persons; using improper means to
achieve that action (such as coercion, force, fraud or abduction); with an improper purpose (sexual
exploitation or forced labor).163 At its core, human trafficking prohibits forced or coerced labor of any kind,
including sexual services.
In some cases, surrogacy, as any other service or labor, can certainly raise human trafficking concerns of
surrogate women and, arguably, because surrogacy is currently performed in unregulated environments
by women who are economically vulnerable, concerns may be heightened. In studies on surrogacy in
India, where surrogacy was not regulated at the time, some women reported that they were lured by false
monetary promises or pressured into engaging in or continuing the process. 164 For the children born
through surrogacy arrangements, there is certainly a danger that they could be commissioned by
individuals with the intention of exploitation. However, authors were not able to find documented
examples of this.165
In assessing the significance of concerns around human trafficking of women in the context of surrogacy,
it is important to distinguish the elements of surrogacy that make it potentially exploitative. A woman
may legitimately choose to serve as a surrogate to improve her livelihood, help another family, or both.
Human trafficking of a surrogate may only exist if the ability of the surrogate to make her own decisions
is undermined through coercion, force or certain forms of deception. 166 Thus, where none of these
conditions exist, by participating in surrogacy, a woman is simply exercising her right to make her own
choices. To address concerns of the potential for human trafficking of women, states can establish
protective measures to ensure that all women who engage in surrogacy do so freely and are fully informed
of the implications of their decision.167 Such measures, discussed at length in the following sections, could
include the right for the surrogate to have access to independent counsel to make sure that her rights and
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interests are protected168 and the implementation of an administrative or judicial procedure to review
and approve the surrogacy agreement and its observance.169 Under conditions where there is ensured
monitoring and regulation of the process and proper surrogacy agreements are made, respected and
enforced, there is no reason for surrogacy to pose human trafficking concerns any more than many other
forms of labor.
Similarly, the trafficking of children through surrogacy would only occur where the purpose of the practice
is to subject the child to exploitation or sexual services. Surrogacy practices can and have resulted in
children being raised by loving parents with surrogate women providing a valuable service and being
adequately compensated for it. In fact, available evidence indicates that this may be the norm. To address
concerns of trafficking of children through surrogacy, states should put in place mechanisms aimed at
ensuring all children born through surrogacy grow up in environments protecting their best interests. Such
measures can include regulation of intermediary organizations as well as pre- and/or post-conception
screening and monitoring mechanisms.
Moreover, banning surrogacy is likely to increase the risk of human trafficking for some, as a ban risks
driving the industry underground and to less protective environments.170 In countries in which economic
desperation is widespread and, in the absence of state regulation, unchecked intermediaries may create
dangerous conditions for surrogacy. Human trafficking concerns are likely to be even worse if surrogates
themselves are criminalized, as they will not dare come forward after suffering abuses in the black market
for fear of being arrested and prosecuted. In such circumstances, an international mechanism for ensuring
adequate oversight and protection may be necessary to safeguard against human trafficking concerns.
(See Recommendations below).

3.

FORCED LABOR

Similar to human trafficking, there is little evidence that surrogacy has been widely performed under
conditions of forced labor.171 But as discussed in the previous section, vulnerable women could be coerced
or pressured into surrogacy or forced to continue the process against their will. While this can and does
happen with other forms of labor (including domestic work, restaurant work and garment labor), because
a surrogate provides a service that requires dedication for a period of time and compromises her physical
state through pregnancy, concerns of forced or compelled labor are arguably heightened and should be
addressed by protective mechanisms to ensure a surrogate has the ability to make choices freely and
engage in the process with proper consent.
Many international and human rights instruments prohibit forced labor.172 The Forced Labor Convention
defines this practice as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under menace of penalty
and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” 173 Cases in which an employer or
recruiter makes certain false promises with serious consequences so that a worker takes a job she would
not otherwise have accepted can constitute forced labor. 174 Similarly, surrogacy arrangements could
amount to forced labor where contract terms make it impossible for surrogates to break the agreement,
perhaps by imposing extreme financial penalties for breach.175
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Forced labor raises the same concerns of coercion and lack of informed consent as were examined in the
previous section on human trafficking. Proper guarantees must ensure that women engage in surrogacy
willingly and are able to retain the necessary control throughout the process. For instance, some
jurisdictions specify that until surrogates are pregnant, they cannot be penalized for changing their
minds.176 Similarly, at least one US state provides that surrogates cannot be penalized for terminating the
surrogacy agreement.177 States must ensure that women are not coerced, tricked, or forced into serving
as surrogates, either by intermediaries or others, and that contractual terms are honored, including fair
compensation and protection from punitive penalties. Restrictions on women’s movement (travel
restrictions), activities and other aspects of the process must be carefully analyzed to ensure the
surrogate’s labor (including all elements of the preparation, fertilization, birth and pregnancy) is voluntary
and not restricted in a manner that constitutes forced or compelled labor.

B.

RIGHTS OF WOMEN
1.

REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, HEALTH AND BODILY AUTONOMY

Women have a right to control their own bodies and make their own reproductive choices.178 Decisions
to become pregnant, donate an egg, terminate a pregnancy (under some circumstances), or avoid a
pregnancy fall within women’s rights to make autonomous choices about their own bodies.179 While these
rights may be limited in some jurisdictions, when balanced with other important rights and/or state
interests, they are rights under international law nonetheless. In the surrogacy context, complete bans
or disproportionate restrictions may undermine women’s reproductive choices and health.
Women have a right to control their own bodies and make their
own reproductive choices.

The primary foundations for these rights under international and regional law are the right to privacy, the
right to health, and reproductive rights. Under Articles 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
17 ICCPR, 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 11 of the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR) and Principle 21 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, women are protected against
arbitrary and unlawful interferences with their privacy. Under Articles 25 UDHR and Article 12 ICESCR,
women have the right to the highest attainable standard of health.
The UN Committees on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have
interpreted the right to privacy and the right to health to grant individuals a right to physical integrity. 180
This right protects women against outside interference with their bodies, such as physical assault,
inhuman and degrading treatment, forced sterilization, and restrictions on their freedom of movement.181
The Committees have also recognized as components of the rights to health and privacy a right to bodily
autonomy which entitles women to make their own informed decisions about their bodies, including
reproductive choices. 182 Various human rights treaty bodies have found that sterilization without
informed consent, 183 as well as denial of an abortion where it was legal or where the fetus was not
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viable,184 to violate women’s bodily integrity and autonomy. These decisions stressed the importance of
freedom of choice for women.
In addition, the right to access to the highest attainable standard of health includes a right to reproductive
health, which means that “women and men have the freedom to decide if and when to reproduce and
the right to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family
planning of their choice as well as the right of access to appropriate health-care services that will, for
example, enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth.” 185 Article 16 of the CEDAW
reaffirms women’s right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and
to have access to the information, education and means to do so.186 All of these rights are important
aspects of sexual and reproductive health rights.187
Women’s decision to engage in surrogacy invokes the foundational health and reproductive rights listed
above. However, the surrogacy process, in practice, does not always protect those rights. 188 Where
intermediaries recruit surrogates without their informed consent, such as when surrogates are not
informed about medical treatments or contract terms, their reproductive rights and right to autonomy
are being violated by third parties. 189 Some
surrogates, for instance, have had fetal
The assumption that surrogacy is not decent
reduction procedures without being warned in
work may rest on stereotypical assumptions
advance that they may be asked to undergo
about women and their roles, which
such a procedure. 190 Surrogate rights may
historically leads to undervaluing women’s
similarly be violated if they are compelled to live
work and seldom leads to greater protection
in clinics or hostels and subjected to restrictive
rules. As discussed previously, this was often the
of women and their autonomy.
case for Indian surrogates, who were usually
housed in clinics or hostels away from their
families and made to observe strict routines. 191 Failure to provide adequate medical care also raises
concerns over surrogates’ reproductive rights and right to health, such as in cases where surrogates were
denied post-natal care entirely.192
Regulation and oversight is needed to address abusive or coercive surrogacy to ensure women’s
reproductive rights are protected. However, a complete ban or overly restrictive limitations on surrogacy
may infringe on women’s reproductive rights and freedoms as well.193 Banning or criminalizing surrogacy
threatens women’s right to bodily autonomy and reproductive freedom because it takes away their
choice, and could also leave women vulnerable to abuse in an illegal market.194 Regulations and oversight
mechanisms to ensure the surrogates’ free consent, freedom of movement, and physical integrity
protects these rights while guarding against abuse of other core rights.197

2.

NON-DISCRIMINATION AND A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION

Prohibitions on gender discrimination and promoting women’s equality are also significant to surrogacy.
Since only women can become surrogates, laws restricting or prohibiting surrogacy essentially restrict the
rights of women alone.198 CEDAW requires countries to address gender-discrimination and to do so in the
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context of reproductive choices and activities, which often impact women disproportionately. 199 In
addition, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), as well as the ICCPR, also require
states to ensure non-discrimination in the context of laws and policies around reproductive rights and
choices. 200 This includes ensuring laws on reproductive choices are not based on gender stereotypes
including traditional conceptions of motherhood and maternity.201 In states where surrogacy practices are
banned or criminalized, including through criminal prosecution of women serving as surrogates, the ban
has a severe and discriminatory impact on women, raising equality concerns.202
As a result, restrictions on surrogacy may violate the human rights treaty provisions on nondiscrimination, especially where policymakers cannot show compelling justifications for the restrictions,
such as evidence that they are essential to protecting rights of other parties that outweigh women’s rights
to be free from discrimination. Even where surrogacy restrictions do not violate antidiscrimination laws,
a legal system that values women’s rights and equality should ensure that surrogacy regulations are
consistent with those values by avoiding undue restrictions on women’s freedom.

3.

LABOR RIGHTS AND JUST AND FAVORABLE WORKING CONDITIONS

Women have the right to work and to choose work freely.203 While commercial surrogacy has not been
designated as “labor” under international law, it is an arrangement in which parties agree, through a
contractual arrangement, that a service will be performed in exchange for payment. Common definitions
of labor or work require an activity that involves mental or physical exertion in order to achieve a purpose
or result. 204 This definition suits the services performed by the surrogate which include becoming
pregnant, being pregnant, engaging in various behaviors and duties while pregnant and giving birth, a
process that takes approximately one year. In exchange, the intended parent(s) provide compensation
and additional benefits and services. In many jurisdictions, the intended parent(s) will also cover any lost
wages if the woman has to temporary leave other employment.
Commercial surrogacy provides economic opportunities that may be no less desirable than other forms
of difficult work women might otherwise have available such as domestic work, and factory or agricultural
work.205 While no international body has recognized surrogacy as a form of work, the assumption that
surrogacy is not decent work may rest on stereotypical assumptions about women and their roles, which
historically has led to undervaluing women’s work and seldom leads to greater protection of women and
their autonomy. 206 Articles 3 and 5 of CEDAW require states to work towards eliminating such
stereotypical assumptions and to adopt appropriate measures to ensure full and equal enjoyment of
social, political and economic rights for women. Ultimately, allowing only altruistic surrogacy, for example,
may pressure women into providing services for which they would otherwise have been compensated,
further devaluing women’s work.207
In so far as surrogacy may be understood to constitute work, women engaged in surrogacy are entitled to
just and favorable working conditions under Articles 23 UDHR and 7 ICESCR. Just and favorable working
conditions include fair wages that ensure workers and their families a decent living, as well as safe and
healthy working conditions. 208 This applies to altruistic surrogates as well as commercial surrogates:
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General Comment 23 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that “[u]npaid
workers, such as workers in the home or in family enterprises, volunteer workers and unpaid interns, …
have a right to just and favorable conditions of work and should be protected by laws and policies on
occupational safety and health, rest and leisure, and reasonable limitations on working hours, as well as
social security.”209
To ensure just and favorable working conditions, surrogates’
relationships with agencies and intended parent(s) should be
governed by written contracts that are fair and respectful of their
Ultimately, allowing only
rights. 210 Where such contracts provide for fair compensation,
altruistic surrogacy, for
provision of health care or health insurance for pre and post-natal
example, may pressure
care, these provisions must be guaranteed and enforceable. 211
women into providing
These minimal standards of protection have not always been
services for which they would
respected in past cases: surrogates in India have reported not being
otherwise have been
paid full compensation, sometimes without reason, sometimes
compensated, further
because they failed to deliver a live child.212 Surrogates in Cambodia
devaluing women’s work.
interviewed by authors were provided no written agreement. 213
Others have been left without coverage when suffering post-delivery complications.214

C.

RIGHTS OF CHILDREN

Surrogacy, both commercial and altruistic, has important implications for the rights of children born
through surrogacy. As discussed above, though surrogacy does not constitute the sale of children, children
must be protected from potential misuse of the surrogacy process through standards, regulations and
monitoring. Mechanisms that screen intended parent(s) are critical but not the only concerns regarding
children’s rights. Beyond the right to be free from abuse, exploitation or trafficking, children have a
general right to have their best interests protected, as well as a specific right to identity and nationality,
and these rights must be protected in surrogacy arrangements.

1.

THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

To adhere to existing rights principles, surrogacy must comply with the ‘best interests of the child’
standard of the CRC. Article 3(1) of the CRC requires that “[i]n all actions concerning children…the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”215 According to the Committee on the Rights of
the Child, this means that states are required to continually assess how existing laws and policies actually
impact children and their interests.216 Commercial and altruistic surrogacy are not at odds with ‘the best
interests of the child’ standard. In certain circumstances, prohibiting or criminalizing surrogacy may itself
violate the ‘best interests of the child.’
Children born through surrogacy must be protected from discrimination based on the circumstances of
their birth. However, the CRC does not establish that the best interest of the child standard applies to a
child prior to birth, and there are compelling reasons not to introduce this standard until birth.217 The
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‘best interests’ standard includes, among other things, the right to be free from discrimination and
protection from being rendered stateless. Article 2 of the CRC protects children from discrimination based
on ‘birth or other status.’ As the Committee has explained, “children may also suffer the consequences of
discrimination against their parents, for example, if children have been born out of wedlock or in other
circumstances that deviate from traditional values.” 218 Where children born through surrogacy are
prevented from enjoying the same rights, including the right to be with the parents that created them and
the citizenship rights that derive from that parentage, their best interests may be violated. For example,
a rule or a decision that leaves a child stateless or with a woman/family who did not intend to have a child
may violate the best interests of a child born through surrogacy.
Ultimately, ‘the best interests of the child’ is a holistic standard that requires evaluating the specific
context and focusing on real effects, not abstract and existential harms, of any given policy or law on
children.219 The Committee has repeatedly pointed out the importance of parents in ensuring the best
interests of the child.220 When evaluating a practice, and the specifics of a given case, policymakers should
recognize the role of the intended parent(s) as key protectors of the best interests of children born
through surrogacy. There is nothing so crucial to safeguarding a child’s rights as having willing, committed
and supportive parent(s). Pre- and post-conception vetting and monitoring mechanisms can help ensure
intended parent(s) are able to fulfill their parental duties.
It is important to remember intended parent(s) are simply individuals who wish to have children but
cannot do so without medical assistance. They are no less likely than other parents to value and promote
the interests of the child. In such circumstances, once that relationship exists, ‘the best interests of the
child’ requires protection of that relationship, including laws that ensure full parental rights. In fact, the
European Court of Human Rights, in Mennesson v. France, found a violation of the children’s right to
respect for private life when French authorities refused to recognize in law the parent/child relationship
between intended parent(s) and the children born through surrogacy. 221 The Court, in its judgment,
referred to and invoked the ‘best interests of the child’ standard in interpreting Article 8 right to private
life of the child.222
In addition, the CRC Committee in General Comment No. 14 stated that the “term ‘family’ must be
interpreted in a broad sense to include biological, adoptive or foster parents.”223 Under Article 9 of the
CRC, children should not be separated from their parents against their will unless a judicial determination
is made of abuse or mistreatment and it is determined such separation is in the best interests of the child.
This principle should arguably apply even when there is no genetic link with the intended parent(s).
Numerous studies have shown that lacking a genetic link in no way undermines the welfare of a child, as
children born through surrogacy have been shown to be well-adjusted with strong and positive ties to
their parents. 224 Recently, in a joint report on surrogacy practices in the United Kingdom, the Law
Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission proposed abandoning the
requirement of a genetic link in domestic surrogacy arrangements in cases of medical necessity,
recognizing that “removing this requirement would reflect the view that in a surrogacy arrangement, the
shared intention of the intended parent(s) and the woman who will be the surrogate to bring the child
into the world for the parents to raise, is more significant than the genetic parentage of the child”.225 Thus,
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any restrictions on recognizing the parentage of a child born through surrogacy may significantly
undermine the family so crucial to ensuring a child’s best interest.
Bans and other restrictions on surrogacy have separated children from their intended parent(s) raising
serious questions about whether such separations were in the children’s best interests.226 For example,
as a result of recent prosecutions in Cambodia of women serving as surrogates, children born through
surrogacy were separated from their intended parent(s)—in many cases those they were genetically
linked to. Surrogates were given the choice between criminal prosecution and raising the children as their
own.227 In such circumstances, parents who wanted the children—who likely have prepared financially,
mentally, and practically to support the children as part of their family—are prevented from raising the
children, while women who had no intention of raising another child are forced to do so. This approach,
however well intentioned, raises serious questions about whether the best interests of the child are
protected through such restrictive and punitive measures.

2.

RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY

Surrogacy implicates the child’s right to an identity. This right is protected under Articles 7 and 8 of the
CRC; it includes the right to a name, a nationality and family relations, and should be enjoyed by the child
from birth. This right may be in jeopardy in the context of transnational surrogacy. As mentioned above,
jurisdictional hurdles may arise when intended parent(s) from one country enter a surrogacy arrangement
in another.228 Where the provider country recognizes only the intended parent(s) as parent(s), but the
receiving country recognizes only the surrogate as a parent, the children may be left without legal
statehood or parent(s).229
Such a situation violates children’s right to an identity and nationality and goes against their best interests
as discussed in the previous section. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has directed
states to register children as the intended parent(s)’s child, notwithstanding national laws to the contrary,
given the citizenship, nationality and identity rights of the child.230 According to the Strasbourg Court, in
order to protect a child’s right to private life,
national law must provide for the possibility of
Even if states decide to ban surrogacy in
recognizing the legal relationship established
their own territory, they should not deny
abroad between the child born to a surrogate
the rights of children already born.
and the intended parent(s), at least when the
parent is genetically related to the child.231
The lack of coordination or consistency among states on surrogacy, parentage, and citizenship give rise to
these problems. International cooperation may help to address them.232 States have the duty to take all
appropriate measures to ensure that children’s rights are protected and that they have citizenship and
parentage from birth, in line with their best interests. 233 These problems also highlight the fact that
children’s rights may suffer from a state’s blanket ban on recognition of children born through surrogacy.
Even if states decide to ban surrogacy in their own territory, they should not deny the rights of children
already born.
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D.

RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF INTENDED PARENT (S)
1.

DISCRIMINATION IN THE ENJOYMENT OF REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM

Finally, surrogacy facilitates the intended parent(s)’s right to found a family without discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation or disability. The right to found a family is widely recognized in international
law: it is contained in Article 16 of the UDHR, Article 23 of the ICCPR, Article 10(1) of the CESCR, Article 12
ECHR, Article 17 of the ACHR, Article 18 of the ACHPR, and Principle 19 of the ASEAN Human Rights
Declaration. Article 10 ICESCR emphasizes that “the widest possible protection and assistance should be
accorded to the family…particularly for its establishment.” CCPR General Comment N°19 states that “the
right to found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to procreate and live together.”234 The right to
found a family, combined with reproductive rights, can establish a right to reproductive assistance. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized the right to personal integrity and liberty and the right
to family life in Article 11 ACHR protects access of couples to artificial reproductive technology. While the
European Court of Human Rights has extended states deference through the margin of appreciation for
regulating reproductive technologies, especially when the states have engaged in careful deliberative
processes, the Strasbourg court has noted that the Court would have to keep the issue under review to
keep pace with the social and scientific developments in the field.235
In addition, Article 23 of the CRPD requires states to take measures to end discrimination in order to
ensure recognition of the right of persons with disabilities to found a family, to retain their fertility on an
equal basis with others, and to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children;
they must also be provided with “the means necessary to enable them to exercise this right.” 236
Infertility may constitute a form of disability, defined as “including those who have long-term physical,
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their
full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.” 237 Providing infertile people
access to surrogacy is a way of allowing them to fully enjoy their reproductive rights on an equal basis
with those who are fertile. According to the the World Health Organization (WHO) more than 180 million
couples suffer infertility in developing countries. These couples are severely stigmatized due to
childlessness and often isolated and excluded as a result. Resource-poor communities and countries with
significant socio-economic challenges especially lack access to reproductive technologies, rendering
infertile individuals and couples unable to avail themselves of scientific advancements. This inequality in
access to reproductive technologies and processes may violate the right of all to share in scientific
advancements and technology, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
ICESCR.238
Access to surrogacy is also a way of allowing same-sex couples to exercise their reproductive rights and
their right to found a family on par with heterosexual individuals. Surrogacy is indeed the only option
available to couples composed of two biological men who want to have a genetically-related child.
Principles of equal protection of the law and freedom from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation can therefore be frustrated by the limitation of access to reproductive technologies, including
surrogacy.239
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These rights may of course be restricted when necessary to protect the rights of other parties. However,
because surrogacy facilitates the rights of intended parent(s), regulations restricting it must be adequately
justified by a genuine showing that they are necessary to protect competing rights.

IV.

CAMBODIA CASE STUDY
A.

BACKGROUND

Authors selected Cambodia as a case study to illustrate the challenges and dynamics involved in
transnational surrogacy arrangements. Most surrogate women participating in transnational surrogacy
are located in countries with comparatively low wages, inadequate health care systems and poorly
performing rule of law mechanisms.240 As explained further below, these conditions can create barriers
to the development of human rights-compliant surrogacy practices. In Cambodia, unique political and
cultural dynamics stemming from the after-effects of the genocide further complicate these shared
challenges.
As noted above, in March 2019, authors traveled to Cambodia to conduct fact-finding for this report.
Authors interviewed key individuals in relevant government bodies, international agencies, service
providers, and three surrogate women. All interviewees, with the exception of government officials, who
will be identified, will be referred to by sector.241 The three surrogate women interviewed will be referred
to as A, C, and K to protect their privacy. This section will address the development of surrogacy in
Cambodia, the recent government ban, and the experience of female surrogates. It will also explore the
conditions that make human rights-compliant surrogacy arrangements a challenge in the Cambodian
context.

B.

CAMBODIAN CONTEXT

In recent decades, Cambodia has achieved remarkable improvement across economic, political and social
dimensions. The country’s economy is growing at one of the highest rates in the world; public services like
healthcare are more widely available; and gender inequality has decreased. These achievements
demonstrate a significant and positive shift given the country’s poor economic, political and social
conditions during the 1970s, which resulted from the radical leadership of the Communist Party of
Kampuchea. Nonetheless, there are some ongoing obstacles to the achievement of economic and social
equality.
During the last few decades, Cambodia has had to recover from the violent and radical regime of the
Communist Party of Kampuchea, also known as the Khmer Rouge, which led the country from 1975 to
1979. The Khmer Rouge implemented a radical Maoist and Marxist-Leninist transformation program
aimed at creating a rural, classless society.242 As a part of this process, approximately two million people—
nearly a quarter of Cambodia’s population—died through extrajudicial executions, starvation, disease,
and exhaustion.243 Improvements in areas like the economy, public health, and gender equality indicate
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that Cambodia is transitioning out of this period of violence and poverty, however the legacy of this period
remains and continues to impact the country.
Indeed, while Cambodia has achieved impressively low levels of crime and civil conflict compared to
similarly situated countries, 244 its regulatory enforcement and civil justice system remain uneven. 245
Limited access to courts and ineffective contractual enforcement mechanisms, especially for lowerincome populations, can be particularly challenging to citizens.246
Between 1995 and 2018, the Cambodian economy grew at an average rate of 7.7 percent, which is one of
the highest growth rates in the world.247 In 2015, the World Bank classified Cambodia as a lower-middle
income economy, noting development across a range of areas, including per capita income and
operational lending. 248 The majority of employment opportunities are in the agricultural, food and
construction industries, as well as in garment manufacturing, real estate and tourism. Garment exports,
construction and tourism largely drive the economy’s growth. 249 Though the economy has grown
impressively, poverty remains a widespread issue. Currently, the poverty rate is 13.5 percent, but this
does not include the 4.5 million Cambodians who are close to the poverty line,250 and living in rural regions
where economic opportunities are limited.251 In addition, Cambodia’s government is somewhat limited in
its institutional capacity, with consistent lower tier rankings in international rule of law indices.252
Public services like healthcare have progressed over the last decades as well, largely as a result of reforms
in the 1990s, combined with continued investment in the health care system. As metrics such as life
expectancy and mortality rates indicate, public health has improved alongside developments in public
services. In 1990, life expectancy was 53.6 years of age; by 2017, it had increased to 69.3 years of age. 253
Mortality rates for female and male adults fell during this period as well, from 309 to 139 per 1,000 people
and 387 to 205 per 1,000 people, respectively.254 Still, Cambodians face obstacles to accessing health care,
especially those who cannot afford significant out-of-pocket payments, or who lack knowledge about
available health care services, such as reproductive technologies.255
Cambodia has also made significant advances in gender equality. In recent years, women have become
increasingly involved in the work force and are attaining higher levels of education, as compared to
Cambodian men.256 However, as in most countries, women still receive less education and less pay than
men overall, and they are underrepresented in government.257 Culturally, they are often expected to put
the interests of their husbands, children, and extended family members before their own.258
Improvements in the economy, in public services, political organization, and social inequality signify
Cambodia’s progression following a period of radical political upheaval and violence. However, the legacy
of the Khmer Rouge continues, indicating ongoing obstacles in the foreseeable future.
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C.

PRACTICE OF SURROGACY IN CAMBODIA
1.

THE GROWTH OF SURROGACY IN CAMBODIA

Surrogacy practices became popular in Cambodia around 2015 following increasing restrictions in
neighboring countries in the South-Asian and Southeast-Asian region. 259 Surrogacy agencies found
Cambodia attractive because, at the time, it lacked regulations on surrogacy or any other form of
reproductive technology.260 Furthermore, the cost of surrogacy in Cambodia was still far below the costs
in wealthier western countries. Cambodian surrogacy agencies generally charged intended parent(s),
often Australian and Chinese, approximately 40,000 USD, about 10,000 USD of which was paid to the
surrogate.261 This was far more economical than the cost of surrogacy in countries such as the United
States, where it costs at least 120,000 USD, approximately 30,000 USD to 40,000 USD of which was given
to the surrogate.262 Approximately fourteen agencies and clinics subsequently opened in Phnom Penh
after Thailand imposed restrictions on surrogacy.263

2.

CAMBODIA’S BAN ON SURROGACY

Because surrogacy was operating unregulated in Cambodia, some countries and reputable agencies
declined to engage Cambodian surrogates. Australia, for example, issued a warning to intended parent(s)
from Australia seeking surrogates to avoid Cambodia.264 Families through Surrogacy, one of the more
established agencies, also advised intended parent(s) not to engage surrogates in Cambodia because of
the lack of legal regulation.265
Cambodia’s Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Ministry of Justice began to note that surrogacy practices
were occurring without regulation shortly thereafter. Both ministries took public positions that surrogacy
exploited Cambodian women266 and characterized it as a form of human trafficking in which children were
sold as goods. 267 In September 2016, the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs announced that it would take steps to protect women and
As a condition of their
children involved in surrogacy.268 And in October 2016, Ang Vong
Vathana, a justice minister, called for a national prohibition on
bail, the forty-three
surrogacy.269
On October 24, 2016, the Ministry of Health banned all forms of
surrogacy in Cambodia.270 The Ministry sent a communication to
about fifty surrogacy agencies in Phnom Penh declaring surrogacy
to be “completely banned.” 271 The Ministry also instituted a
prohibition on commercial sperm donation and required clinics
and specialist doctors providing in vitro fertilization services to
acquire its permission before operating.272 The proclamation did
not address enforcement mechanisms or penalties for
violation. 273 Nor did it mention the legal status of preexisting
surrogacy arrangements.274
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women must raise the
children born through
surrogacy as their
own. Failure could
result in their arrest.

3.

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF SURROGATES AND AGENCIES

Following the Ministry of Justice’s proclamation, the government began to charge surrogacy agencies and
surrogates with human trafficking.275 In October of 2016, the Cambodian police arrested an Australian
nurse, Tammy Davis-Charles, and two Cambodians on charges of human trafficking, forging documents
such as birth certificates, and operating an illegal surrogacy clinic. 276 The clinic had managed
approximately twenty-five surrogacy arrangements for Australian intended parent(s) who paid
approximately 50,000 USD each.277 The Court eventually sentenced the operators to one and a half years
in prison for acting as intermediaries as well as for falsifying birth certificates. 278 In June 2018, the
Cambodian police arrested one Chinese national and four Cambodian women under charges of human
trafficking and operating as surrogacy brokers.279 In the same raid, the Cambodian police also arrested
thirty-two surrogates, charging them with cross-border human trafficking; their experience is reproduced
below in the section entitled “Surrogate Women Interviewed.”280 In November 2018, the police arrested
fifteen more people for participating in a surrogacy business, eleven of whom were pregnant
surrogates.281
Not all government officials approved of the prosecutions of the surrogates, noting that detention of the
women would have an adverse impact on the babies born from these arrangements.282 Her Excellency
Chou Bun Eng, the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Interior and the Chairwoman of the National
Committee for Counter-Trafficking, advocated for the release of surrogates detained in favor of
supervised probation.283 She has argued that the surrogates had developed an attachment to the babies,
had a desire to keep them, and so should be allowed to do so.284 As a result of this advocacy, the police
released—on bail—the thirty-two women of the June 2018 raid in December 2018 and the eleven women
of the November 2018 raid in April 2019.285 As a condition of their bail, the forty-three women must raise
the children born of surrogacy as their own and report each month to the police with the child until she
or he is 18 years old.286 The failure to meet either of these requirements could result in their arrest.287
Thus far, in one case the trial judge has yet to set a court date, in the other, investigation is ongoing.288
Accounts vary as to whether the intended parent(s) of the babies being raised by the Cambodian surrogate
mothers have made efforts to claim their children. According to government officials, “very few” intended
parent(s) have come forward to claim the babies.289 H.E. Eng stated that “only three or four” people have
filed applications claiming parentage of the babies despite the Ministry of Interior giving them until
January 2018, or more specifically one year, to do so. 290 However, surrogates’ and service providers’
accounts indicate that more than three or four intended parent(s) have traveled to Cambodia and tried
to legally adopt the children.291 Some surrogacy agencies have also continued to advocate for the children
to be released to them.292 Furthermore, a service provider asserted that the government is adamant that
the babies do not leave the country.293 H.E. Eng corroborated this view by stating that intended parent(s)
“do not only want a baby” but “also want to export it out of the country,” which “falls under the definition
of child trafficking” in Cambodia.294 Given this government attitude and the differing accounts, it is unclear
if intended parent(s) have neglected to come forward or have found it impossible to claim the babies due
to the government’s stance.
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4.

SURROGATE WOMEN INTERVIEWED

As described above, a total of forty-three surrogate women have been released on bail following their
arrest on the condition that they raise the children born of surrogacy. 295 Authors interviewed three of
these women who were arrested on June 21, 2018 along with twenty-nine other surrogates.296 The three
women will be referred to using aliases A, C and K to protect their privacy and allay concerns that sharing
their experiences in interviews will compromise their conditional releases from detention. Their
experiences as surrogates will be detailed in this section. A, C and K are all around 30 years old and were
born in rural provinces. At various points, all three women found work in garment factories, as well as in
the construction and service industries.297 Authors were informed that their backgrounds are common for
surrogates in Cambodia, who often come from communities in Cambodia’s rural provinces to more urban
areas, looking for opportunities to work.298
A lives in Phnom Penh, though she plans to eventually return to the province where she was born.299 She
has several young children. A used to work as a packager in a garment factory in Phnom Penh, but she
currently stays at home to take care of her children. Her husband works as a construction worker.300 C
moved to Phnom Penh in 2010 from a province to work as a waitress, but after a year of waitressing, she
started to work in a garment factory.301 She now stays at home to take care of her children. C’s husband
also works in construction.302 K lives in the province where she was born with her children. K also used to
work in a garment factory, but now she works in construction with her husband.303 K’s mother takes care
of K’s young children.304
A, C and K were all primarily motivated to work as surrogates for financial reasons.305 When A worked in
packaging at a garment factory, she earned around 130 USD per month if she worked nine-hour shifts,
and sometimes up to 200 USD if she worked overtime shifts of between eleven and fourteen hours.306 As
a construction worker, A’s husband usually earns around 5 USD per day, although he sometimes earns up
to 10 USD.307 A hoped that becoming a surrogate would help her to pay off her family’s debt of 1,800 USD,
a debt she incurred when she borrowed money from her bank to start a fishing business in her old
province. 308 Currently, she pays her bank about 183 USD per month, on top of her other monthly
expenses, which total around 150 USD.309
C also worked in a garment factory, after working for a year as a waitress. In the factory, she made around
120-150 USD per month, including overtime, and worked twelve-hour shifts.310 As a construction worker,
C’s husband currently makes 10 USD per day.311 When she became a surrogate, C owed her bank around
3,000-4,000 USD, a debt accrued from her mother’s medical expenses.312 At the time, C’s husband was
unable to pay off the debts, and C hoped that the money earned from surrogacy would help her to cover
them. Since then, C’s brother has covered the payments.313
Before starting her job as a construction worker, K worked eight-hour shifts in a garment factory, earning
50-60 USD per month.314 As a construction worker, K currently earns around 6.25 USD per day for eight
hours of work while her husband earns 10 USD per day for the same hours.315 K planned to use money
earned from surrogacy to buy her own land.316 She currently lives on state-owned property, which she
could be expelled from.317 K also has a debt of over 2000 USD.318
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a)
R ECRUITMENT AND P REGNANCY
A, C, and K first learned about surrogacy from a co-worker.319 Each was told by their co-worker that they
would receive an initial 500 USD payment, in addition to a payment of 300 USD per month, plus a lump
sum at the end of the process that would bring the total income to approximately 10,000 USD.320 They
were also told that they would be given housing for the duration of the pregnancy.321 None attested to
being coerced. When C was first approached by her co-worker about surrogacy in 2014, she declined the
offer and only later accepted due to her family’s financial needs.322
After expressing interest in working as surrogates, A, C and K were given more specific details about the
surrogacy process. A’s co-worker gave her an address near A’s home where A recalls meeting an older
woman who gave her further information about compensation.323 A, C, and K were all told that during the
pregnancy, they would have to live in a home with other surrogates and would give the baby away once
they gave birth.324 They also met with other surrogates who described the surrogacy process, laid out the
difficulties involved, and attested to being paid in full.325
All three women expressed concerns about surrogacy. A worried about the effects of the pregnancy on
her health and that of the baby.326 C initially feared that she was being cheated, but after receiving an
initial 500 USD for the implantation, her fear subsided.327 C was also concerned for the child’s safety upon
giving birth.328 Closer to her due date, when she learned she would have to deliver the baby in China, K
expressed reservations about leaving Cambodia, since she had never left before.329
Before starting any medical processes, each woman had to pass a medical and a blood test. In addition,
they were examined by a doctor with whom they met at every subsequent appointment.330 None of the
three surrogates recall that the physician explained the medical risks or performed any psychological
evaluations. 331 Once they passed their medical examinations, their IDs were taken, photocopied, and
returned.332 None of them signed contracts, nor did they receive any information about the intended
parent(s).333
Once they passed their medical examinations, each woman went through a slightly different medical
procedure to prepare for the pregnancy. A was told she was being given drugs to thicken her uterus; she
took this medication for fourteen days.334 Afterwards, she was given an injection, whose purpose she did
not know. Following the injection, the doctor implanted the embryo in her.335 She then took pills and
received daily injections for three months and twelve days, which she was told would help the fetus
develop in her uterus.336 C recalls getting injections for five days. Following the injections, an embryo was
implanted. She then received continuous injections for three months.337 K ingested one pill for five days;
she also received daily injections for three months after implantation.338
Upon successful implantation, the surrogacy brokers paid each woman 500 USD and transported them to
a large house where they lived with other surrogates for the duration of their pregnancies. 339 At the
“shelter,” the brokers provided the women with housekeeping services and cooks that prepared each of
the surrogates’ meals.340 The cooks ensured that they did not eat anything cold or sour, as cultural norms
recommended for pregnant women.341 The brokers also directed the surrogates to rest and to remain in
the house, telling them they could at most “go around the shelter.”342 For each month they stayed at the
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home, the brokers paid the surrogates 300 USD. 343 The surrogacy agency also covered all medical
expenses.344 All three surrogates stopped working at the garment factory.345 Each woman reported good
conditions at the accommodations provided and a relatively easy pregnancy, although C experienced
some difficulties due to a thin uterus.346
b)
A RREST
None of the interviewed women were aware that surrogacy was banned in Cambodia.347 According to K,
the home in which the surrogates stayed was “public”; thus, the Cambodian police’s raid on the house
and their arrest on June 21, 2018 came as a shock.348
The police brought the surrogates to the police station where they explained that the Cambodian
government had outlawed surrogacy and questioned them about their surrogacy experiences.349 At the
time, A was one month pregnant, K was four months pregnant, and C was eight months pregnant. 350 A
and K were detained for 24 hours, and C was detained for 48 hours. 351 Upon their release, Agape
International Mission (AIM), a Christian anti-trafficking organization, took custody of the women and
placed them in their facilities for two weeks following the initial arrest.352
In July 2018, the surrogates were formally charged with cross-border human trafficking.353 Phnom Penh’s
Social Affairs Department subsequently gained custody of the women and detained them at a police
hospital on the outskirts of Phnom Penh.354 AIM provided the surrogates with legal representation.355
The three surrogates were held at the police hospital
for five months although they were never convicted None of the interviewed women were
of any crimes. 356 In December 2018, the surrogates aware that surrogacy was banned in
were released on bail on the condition that they raise Cambodia.
the children that they birthed.357 They were told that
if they tried to give the babies to the agencies or
intended parent(s), they would be charged with human trafficking and imprisoned for fifteen years.358
On the day of their release, K went into labor and gave birth to a healthy child.359 C gave birth in the prison
hospital, and A did not give birth until January 2019.360 All three surrogates had caesarean sections.361
c)
R ELEASE AND C URRENT C IRCUMSTANCES
All three interviewed surrogates have been released and are currently being monitored. Each month, they
must report to the police and confirm that they still have the child, a requirement they assume will
continue until the child is an adult.362 This check-in process is difficult for K. She no longer lives in Phnom
Penh, so she has to take a two-hour round trip to report to the police station, costing her 1.25 USD each
way.363 None of the women interviewed received full compensation for surrogacy. Following their arrests,
their 300 USD payments ended.364 Ultimately, A only received 500 USD for her successful implantation, C
was paid approximately 3000 USD for her eight months of pregnancy, and K was paid 1100 USD for four
months of pregnancy.365
According to the surrogates, efforts were made by the surrogacy agency and intended parent(s) to request
the child born of the process. A received a phone call while in detention about the baby, though she was
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unsure who called and assumed it was the agency.366 C was contacted by the broker following her release
from the prison hospital.367 She met with the broker and the intended father, who requested to see and
spend time with the baby.368 C allowed the father to see the child, who was the spitting image of the
father, but did not allow him to take the baby since she ran the risk of being imprisoned.369 Although she
did not accompany the intended father and did not elaborate on how she gathered this information, C
claims that the intended father later filed a complaint with the court.370 She does not know what came of
the complaint.371
The three women described receiving both criticism and pity from their communities as a result of serving
as surrogates.372 A, for instance, stated that her neighborhood pities her because she “has been through
a lot of difficulties and now has to raise the baby.”373 At the same time, some members of A’s community
believe that she accidentally became pregnant with a child as a result of promiscuous behavior.374 C’s
community, on the other hand, told her that she should never have become a surrogate in the first
place.375
C has also faced criticism from her family. Her husband did not want her to be a surrogate and is now
resentful of the additional burden of raising the child.376 C’s brother-in-law offered to adopt the child, but
C refused, uncertain as to how he would treat the child.377
When asked, all three surrogates affirmed that they had become emotionally attached to the children.378
They hope that they have bright futures and can become educated.379 K, in particular, hopes that the baby
can grow up to “help [the family] when [it] is older.”380 All three surrogates said they would not consider
serving as surrogates again, regardless of its lawfulness.381

5.

CAMBODIA’S DRAFT SURROGACY LAW

In early 2017, following the issuance of the ban and the arrests of surrogacy brokers, the Cambodian
government began the process of drafting regulations on surrogacy. By August of 2017, the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs circulated a first draft of legislation that was later revised by the Ministry of Justice. The
revised draft banned commercial surrogacy but permitted altruistic surrogacy.382 However, the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs remained concerned that altruistic surrogacy would still allow for exploitation.383 As a
result, an Inter-Ministerial Working Group was formed to further study surrogacy384 and the draft was
again revised.385 The current draft provides detailed regulation of altruistic surrogacy and imposes “strict
conditions” on that process so as to make it extremely difficult to practice legally within Cambodia.386 In
interviews of government officials, authors noted differing opinions on the legal status of surrogacy under
international law (and whether it was by definition human trafficking of children), its impact on women
and children and the policy decisions motivating its restriction.
While the draft law is aimed at “prevent[ing] commercial surrogacy and exploitation of surrogate women,”
its scope reaches far beyond surrogacy into the regulation of all assisted reproductive technologies,
including the production and use of embryos. 387 The law creates a national committee to monitor all
surrogacy arrangements (including approving intended parent(s) and surrogates). 388 The law also
establishes an application process for surrogates and intended parent(s)389 along with an accreditation
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process and monitoring of all hospitals and clinics offering ART services.390 Surrogacy intermediaries that
charge a fee to facilitate arrangements are illegal under the draft legislation.391
Under Article 8, the law sets forth “guidelines and conditions of surrogacy.” 392 Clinics are required to
confirm the suitability of surrogates and intended parent(s), including “physical and mental health of
surrogate women and donated persons to avoid any diseases that can affect the baby.”393 A duplicate
Article 8 in the proposed draft also regulates, in detail, the use of human embryos. The law requires human
embryos to be implanted within 14 days and only be used for the purpose of producing a human child
(other restrictions include prohibitions on sex selection, cloning or experimentation of any kind), among
other restrictions.394 Intended parent(s) of children born through ART are limited to heterosexual married
Cambodians between the ages of 25 and 45;395 they must be without children; take responsibility for the
child post-birth, regardless of the child’s condition; and pay for all costs related to the surrogacy
arrangement.396 Intended parent(s) cannot commission a surrogate more than once.397
Women acting as surrogates must be Cambodian, have previously given birth, be related to the intended
parent(s), and voluntarily consent to surrogacy.398 They also must be married and have their spouses’
permission to become surrogates.399 Chapter 9, Article 13 further stipulates that surrogate women must
be between 25 and 35 years of age and healthy; more specifically, they must be free of any diseases that
may affect the fetus.400
In addition, any embryo made for the purpose of surrogacy must (1) have at least one egg or one sperm
from the intended parent(s), (2) be only from Cambodian donors if donors are used, and (3) be voluntarily
given to the intended parent(s), rather than sold.401 The egg of the surrogate may not be used.402
The law assigns parentage and guardianship of children born via ART.403 Article 9 asserts that “[t]he child
born through the Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) under this law is the legitimate child of this
legally married couple and shall have rights as stated in the civil code.” 404 However, if both the husband
and wife die before the child’s birth, the woman acting as a surrogate will act as the guardian of the child
until the court makes a final decision about guardianship.405
The intended parent(s) and the surrogate must enter into a written agreement with The National
Committee on the Management of Surrogacy (NCMS).406 All parties must be identified,407 the intended
parent(s) must acknowledge the child as their own, declare responsibility for the child, and prove capable
of raising her or him.408 The woman, then, must consent to acting as a surrogate, agree to maintain her
health and the pregnancy, to “transfer” the child to the intended parent(s) upon birth, and to show proof
of her husband’s consent.409 If the intended parent(s) use a sperm donor, he must declare that he has
volunteered to provide healthy sperm to the intended parent(s) and that he does not know who the
intended parent(s) or surrogate are.410
Chapter 8, Article 12 dictates the conditions for donating sperm, eggs or embryos.411 To donate an egg,
sperm, or embryo, donors must volunteer, i.e. they may not be compensated for their donation.412 They
also must have a permanent address in Cambodia, never have been prosecuted for a crime, be healthy,
and be free of diseases that may affect the fetus.413 Women who donate their eggs must be between the
ages of 18 and 40; male donors must be between 18 and 55. 414 If donors meet these criteria, they must
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then receive permission from NCMS. 415 Throughout the entire process, the donor’s identity must remain
confidential.416 Unwanted embryos must be disposed of, rather than sold.417
The law criminalizes surrogates, intended parent(s), and clinics operating without proper approvals. In
fact, any ART services provided without approval are subject to fines and criminal prosecution as well. 418
If an embryo is created for purposes other than surrogacy, such as for scientific studies, or not disposed
of properly, those responsible shall be subject to up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of at most 2446
USD. 419 Municipal and provincial instant courts are tasked with review of any complaints concerning
parentage of the child.420 At present, the legislation is still under review by the Inter-Ministerial Working
Group.421

V.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE REGULATION OF SURROGACY GLOBALLY

As noted above, the practice of surrogacy does not violate human rights, and can promote important
rights of women to bodily autonomy, reproductive choice, and self-determination. Surrogacy can also
facilitate the rights of individuals and couples to have children and form families. However, there are
various aspects of the practice of surrogacy that can, in certain contexts, impair the rights of surrogate
women, children born through surrogacy, and intended parent(s). As previous sections have discussed,
intermediary organizations have operated largely unregulated and often failed to inform surrogates about
important medical and legal processes, provided them with inadequate health care, and subjected them
to unreasonably harsh rules or contract terms.422 Conflicting state laws have left children born through
surrogacy stateless or orphaned,423 and some stakeholders have expressed fears that surrogacy practices
could be used to sell children for malicious purposes such as organ trafficking or sexual exploitation. 424
There is little evidence to suggest that such extreme violations have occurred so far but these concerns
often accompany policy recommendations to restrict or ban surrogacy.425
Drawing on the human rights framework set out above, as well as the Cambodian case study, this section
will consider how the risks of surrogacy can be minimized without unduly inhibiting the human rights of
surrogates and intended parent(s). First, it will discuss the benefits of surrogacy and the risks of restricting
or banning it, emphasizing the need for these factors to be weighed against the risks that may arise from
surrogacy. It then considers the various contextual factors that will affect surrogacy regulation, such as
the existing legal framework in a given country, and the country’s institutional capacity to effectively
implement a regulatory system. These factors will affect the degree of regulation necessary as well as the
types of regulation required. Finally, this section considers the potential for effective regulation of
surrogacy practices in a transnational context. The fact that surrogacy often involves parties from different
countries may create regulatory challenges but can also provide additional regulatory tools.

A.

CONTEXTUALIZING SURROGACY RISKS

Though there are risks associated with surrogacy, it also promotes the rights of women as well as intended
parent(s). In addition, permitting and regulating surrogacy protects all parties, including children, from
the risks of an illegal or unregulated industry. As discussed above, women have the right to bodily
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“[A]T LEAST SOME OF OUR FEMINIST
THEORY MAY BE INSUFFICIENTLY
GROUNDED IN THE REALITY OF WORKINGCLASS LIVES AND TOO FOCUSED ON
SEXUALITY AS AN ISSUE IN ITS OWN RIGHT,
AS IF IT COULD BE EXTRICATED FROM THE
FABRIC OF POOR PEOPLE’S ATTEMPTS TO
SURVIVE.”
Martha Nussbaum

autonomy and reproductive freedom 426 as well as the
right to work in a chosen profession,427 while intended
parent(s) have rights to found families and do so in a
manner free from discrimination based on their identity
or status. 428 These rights must be weighed, of course,
against the rights of children born through surrogacy to
a safe and protective environment, as well as the rights
of women to be free from abusive surrogacy practices
that infringe on their autonomy, endanger their health,
or subject them to unjust working conditions. Where
these rights are in conflict, it may be appropriate to
restrict surrogacy to the extent necessary to protect
these other rights. However, because surrogacy also
promotes and protects important human rights, it
should not be restricted beyond the extent actually
necessary to protect other human rights.

Given the fundamental rights of women, to reproductive and sexual freedom and freedom from cruel and
inhumane treatment (which will likely result if the practice moves underground or is severely restricted
and penalized), absolute restrictions are unlikely to prove suitable, necessary or proportionate. Any
limitations on women’s reproductive rights need to “be interpreted strictly
and…shall not be interpreted so as to jeopardize the essence of the right concerned”, as provided by the
Siracusa Principles. Similarly, given the rights of intended parent(s), including the right to freedom from
discrimination and to equal enjoyment of fundamental rights like the right to a family, states cannot adopt
measures any more restrictive than absolutely required, limitations must be necessary for and suitable to
advance legitimate state interests.429

1.

RIGHTS PROMOTED BY SURROGACY

Surrogacy promotes fundamental human rights and therefore should only be circumscribed as necessary
to protect conflicting rights. As discussed above, women have the right to bodily autonomy, reproductive
choice, self-determination, and choice of profession and therefore have a right to engage in surrogacy if
they choose to do so. This right might properly be limited if outweighed by rights violations arising from
surrogacy. But it cannot be justifiably limited beyond the extent necessary to address those violations;
where the risks of surrogacy can be ameliorated through less restrictive means, such as protective
regulation, international standards and state cooperation, surrogacy should not be excessively restricted.

2.

RISKS OF ALTERNATIVE WORK

In addition to protecting the human rights of surrogate women and facilitating the human rights of
intended parent(s), surrogacy could provide a source of income to women who may have limited options.
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This economic opportunity could facilitate innumerable rights, especially socioeconomic rights such as
social security, an adequate standard of living, health, and education.430 Many of the risks associated with
surrogacy—for instance, the risk that people in financially vulnerable situations will be pressured into an
unpleasant or difficult form of labor for low wages—are not unique to surrogacy, but rather are “common
to a wide range of activities engaged in by poor working women.”431 If surrogacy were banned solely to
protect women from exploitation, they might turn to an option with greater potential for exploitation.
Many surrogates in India and Cambodia, for example, worked difficult and dangerous jobs in garment
factories before becoming surrogates. They worked long hours for low wages, often in abusive
environments.432 Despite widespread attention to the dangerous working conditions of garment factories
in South and Southeast Asia—especially following the 2013 collapse of a garment factory in Bangladesh
that killed over 1,100 workers—safety in these factories continues to be a major issue.433 A 2018 article
reported over 100 textile worker deaths in Tamil Nadu, a state in southern India, in the preceding four
years.434 Indeed, garment factory work is often characterized by some of the very abuses that have been
highlighted in the surrogacy context: women have been “lured in” by “dubious employment agents” who
persuaded them to sign harsh job agreements, after which they have been “crammed into hostels…with
restricted freedom of movement.”435 Similar stories of abuse and exploitation abound of women working
as domestic workers globally. 436 In other words, women’s health, autonomy, and safety may be
endangered by many of the economic opportunities available to them. The risks of surrogacy are not
unique, and it may even be the most beneficial option in certain circumstances. Indeed, numerous
garment workers, including the three surrogates we interviewed, have seen surrogacy as an attractive
economic opportunity that could provide substantial benefits.437
Therefore, while lawmakers must grapple with the risks of surrogacy, a comprehensive understanding of
these risks requires that they are viewed in light of the alternatives available to would-be surrogate
women. Some risks, such as health risks tied to childbirth, or the risk of child trafficking, may be aggravated
in the surrogacy context. But others, such as inadequate compensation, unfavorable contractual terms,
and restrictions on freedom of movement, are likely to characterize any economic pursuit available to a

Many of surrogacy’s supposed risks are not
the result of surrogacy as an industry, but are
instead the inevitable result of extreme social
inequality and poor state infrastructure.
surrogate. In other words, many of surrogacy’s supposed risks are not the result of surrogacy as an
industry, but are instead the inevitable result of extreme social inequality and poor state infrastructure.
Where certain risks accompany the only employment options available to a woman, her rights may be
better promoted by allowing her to choose the option she finds most favorable, even if that option would
not be her preference among unlimited choices. In other words, laws that restrict a woman’s access to
surrogacy as compared to other economic pursuits are only justified to the extent that they address risks
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particular to surrogacy, rather than those that arise from the general state of social and economic
inequality. States would better promote human rights by fulfilling their obligation to address these
structural inequalities themselves, rather than further limiting the choices of women as a result of these
imbalances.
The fact that women are uniquely able to pursue surrogacy makes this framework all the more important.
Women’s choices, including the economic pursuits available to them, are already restricted by gender
inequality throughout the world.438 For instance, over 2.7 billion women are legally restricted from having
the same job choices as men.439 They are less likely to participate in the labor market, more likely to be
unemployed, and receive less pay when they do work.440 As a result, it is essential to ensure that any
further restriction on women’s freedom is justified by legitimate ends, and not motivated by prejudice or
by a misguided attempt to protect women from options they would willingly pursue.
Critics of surrogacy might argue that because pregnancy and childbirth are different from other forms of
labor, they cannot be compared to other dangerous or arduous forms of work. It is true that such
reproductive labor is unique, as it can only be performed by women and entails unique physical and
psychological challenges. However, these differences do not indicate that surrogacy should be banned as
a form of labor. On the contrary, the argument that it is improper to allow a labor market for a form of
labor uniquely performed by women, and closely tied to women’s traditional roles, only reinforces the
idea that work traditionally or biologically performed by women is less valuable. Women are more likely
than men to engage in informal and vulnerable employment, and they bear disproportionate
responsibility for unpaid care work, despite the fact that such work is vital for a functioning economy.441
Those who believe surrogacy somehow tarnishes a woman’s act of carrying and birthing a child are
ultimately reinforcing this trend by demanding that women continue to perform their traditional roles
without obtaining any economic recognition or benefit from them. As traditional gender roles are
increasingly challenged, and women are empowered to perform work formerly restricted to men, it is also
important that labor traditionally performed by women gains the same legitimacy as work traditionally
done by men and is similarly valued. Prohibiting women from enjoying economic gains and empowerment
through the labor they perform in carrying children does not protect the sanctity of that labor, but instead
risks devaluing both the work and the women who perform it.

3.

RISKS OF SURROGACY RESTRICTIONS

Especially given the transnationality of surrogacy, countries are limited in their ability to limit surrogacy
or prohibit it entirely. Because of the global nature of the surrogacy industry, intermediaries have been
able to adapt to changing laws by shifting from country to country, sometimes recruiting women from
one country to act as surrogates in another.442 Additionally, demand for childbearing through surrogacy
is only likely to grow as technology improves, prices decrease, surrogacy becomes more widely known
and understood, and different family structures—including older couples, same-sex couples, and single
parents—become increasingly accepted as families that might want to have children. As a result, it is
unlikely that prohibitions on surrogacy can be implemented effectively, especially on a large scale.443
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This suggests that country-specific prohibitions on surrogacy might undermine global efforts to protect
women from exploitative surrogacy arrangements. First, they might leave women in more vulnerable
positions by encouraging them to cross borders to become surrogates rather than serve as surrogates in
their home countries.444 Second, prohibitions could lead to a race-to-the-bottom phenomenon where
countries capable of enforcing prohibitions push the industry into the countries with the least capacity for
regulation.445 In such countries, the risks associated with poor regulation are likely highest. For countries
capable of implementing effective surrogacy regulations, this may be a reason to legalize surrogacy so
that surrogacy markets remain in countries that can better protect parties’ rights, such that intended
parent(s) will not turn to riskier supplier countries.446
In sum, any policy that restricts access to surrogacy, whether through restrictive surrogacy requirements
or an outright ban, requires a careful balancing of rights, interests and risks. On the one hand, surrogacy
under certain circumstances may entail risks that undermine the human rights of surrogates, children,
and intended parent(s). On the other, it promotes fundamental rights of surrogates and intended
parent(s), and if practiced safely it allows children to be born into loving families where their rights will be
protected. Further, it may offer surrogates an alternative to even riskier options, and reduces the risk that
surrogacy will be practiced illegally or move across borders to locations where women and children would
be at greater risk of exploitation.

B.

FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN REGULATING SURROGACY

In consideration of the above, this report finds that surrogacy should generally be permitted, but
regulated in a manner that protects the rights of all parties involved. But before discussing what the
substantive content of such regulation ought to include, this report will consider important contextual
factors that are relevant to surrogacy policy and its ability to protect parties’ human rights. These factors
will impact how high the risks associated with surrogacy are likely to be, how well equipped a country may
be to manage those risks, and what approach is best suited to ensure adequate protection of the
fundamental human rights of the various parties.
First, this section will consider how a country’s existing legal system may impact surrogacy or interact with
surrogacy laws. Then, it will consider factors that may make surrogacy more or less risky in a given context,
such as the strength of the rule of law, the existing health care system, the degree of gender inequality,
social perceptions of surrogacy, the level of education, the economic situation, and any relevant historical
factors. These factors have implications as to the extent and type of regulations needed to protect human
rights.
While this report seeks to provide preliminary thoughts on the sorts of factors that will implicate
surrogacy’s impact on human rights, and the kinds of regulations that might address these factors, it is
essential that surrogates and other parties have the opportunity to voice their own concerns and offer
their perspectives. In addition to considering the following factors, surrogacy policy should therefore
incorporate a mechanism for hearing and responding to the voices of the people of involved. These
considerations are intended to protect vulnerable parties, especially surrogates, but no analysis can stand
in for the voices of the affected women themselves.
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1.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A country’s existing laws are likely to have implications for surrogacy and how best to regulate it. For
instance, parentage and citizenship laws will affect the rights and obligations of surrogates and children
born through surrogacy. Laws surrounding IVF generally will also come into play, and countries may want
to ensure that any surrogacy-specific laws are consistent with IVF laws. Protective laws surrounding labor,
medical care, reproductive autonomy, and contractual rights may also be relevant. While some countries
may have in place existing protections that offer substantial protection to surrogates, others may need to
supplement existing laws with surrogacy-specific laws that provide certain minimal protections.
Additionally, laws regarding the enforcement of prohibitions must be taken into account, especially where
a country chooses to prohibit or restrict surrogacy. In that case, it must determine how best to implement
such restrictions in a rights-protective manner.
a)
P ARENTAGE AND C ITIZENSHIP L AWS
As illustrated in the section above on the international human rights framework, the way that legal
parentage and citizenship are determined has had implications for the rights of surrogates, intended
parent(s), and children born through surrogacy.447 For instance, if the woman who gives birth to a child is
required to assume legal responsibility for that child regardless of a genetic link between them, as is the
default rule in most countries,448 surrogates could be at risk of parental obligations they neither want nor
can afford. At the same time, intended parent(s) could be left with no legal claim to the children, even
where no other party makes a contesting claim.449 The Cambodian case study described above illustrates
this very outcome. This was also what happened in Paradiso v. Campanelli,450 for instance, when the
Italian government denied parental rights to a pair of intended parent(s) and put the child up for
adoption.451 Regulations will need to address how and at what point in the process intended parent(s)
ought to assume legal parental rights in order to avoid such violations.
Regulations can assign parentage to intended parent(s) from the start, such that the surrogate is never a
legal parent, as is done in numerous jurisdictions currently allowing surrogacy.452 However, in such a case,
regulations will still need to determine who qualifies as an intended parent. If the surrogacy arrangement
is not in agreement with all legal requirements, for instance, this may raise the question as to whether
intended parent(s) are legal parents, and who assumes parental responsibility if they are not legal
parents.453 For example, in the state of Utah in the United States, surrogacy agreements must be validated
by a tribunal in order to be legally enforceable, and tribunals cannot validate agreements unless they meet
strict requirements.454 This could leave a surrogate vulnerable to unwanted parental obligations if the
agreement turned out to be unlawful; however, Utah law specifies that intended parent(s) may still be
liable for the child even if the agreement is otherwise unenforceable.455 Such protections can be helpful
in ensuring that no unforeseen circumstances will leave surrogates with unexpected legal burdens. Similar
provisions could protect the rights of children to ensure that they are not left vulnerable if they result
from an invalid surrogacy agreement. The state of Washington, for example, provides that if a child is born
through an invalid agreement, the court will determine parentage based on the child’s best interest and
the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was signed.456 Such a provision ensures that a child
will not be orphaned due to problems with the surrogacy contract. Of course, such protections should not
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enable parties to ignore protective regulations with impunity by entering invalid surrogacy arrangements,
so other penalties—ones that do not violate the children’s best interests—should be imposed on parties
that violate protective surrogacy laws.
Alternatively, a country’s law may assign parental rights based wholly or partly on genetics. The American
states of Florida and Virginia, for example, require a genetic link between intended parent(s) and children
born through surrogacy. If such a link is not found, the surrogates must assume parental obligations.457
The genetic requirement arguably discriminates against intended parent(s) who are unable to provide any
genetic material, although some jurisdictions may be uncomfortable with the idea that people could
commission children without providing any genetic material themselves. Either way, however, surrogates
should not bear the risk of parental obligations in the case that a clinical error results in a child with no
genetic link to the intended parent(s). Nor should a child already born, even if lacking a genetic link in
violation of the law, be thereby taken from the intended parent(s) in violation of his or her best interests.
Accordingly, a jurisdiction that attaches legal significance to a child’s genetic makeup should ensure that
the rights of surrogates and children will be protected under all circumstances. This means protecting
surrogates from any unwanted parental duties, and ensuring that parental rights will be assigned
according to the child’s best interest.
Alternatively, the surrogate, and perhaps her spouse, could be legal parent(s) until parentage is formally
transferred to the intended parent(s).458 This could leave the surrogate vulnerable to unwanted parental
duties if the intended parent(s) decide to abandon the agreement before assuming parental obligations.
However, it could also empower surrogates by giving them time to make the decision of whether or not
to part with the child. For instance, the state of Washington in the United States allows surrogates a fortyeight hour time frame to decide to keep the child if they decide they want to do so, and South Africa has
a similar provision for traditional surrogates (who unlike gestational surrogates are genetically linked to
the resulting child).459 The goal of this policy is to ensure that surrogates will not be forced to part with
children that they have grown emotionally attached to, minimizing the risk of emotional injury to the
surrogate in parting with a child she has birthed. In both cases, the surrogate must reimburse the intended
parent(s) for costs incurred in the process but may not be charged any additional penalties. These
arrangements potentially empower surrogates by allowing them the final decision regarding the children,
thereby reducing the power imbalance that often exists between surrogates and intended parent(s) or
intermediaries. Also, it need not impose risks of unwanted parental duties for the surrogate; Washington
provides that if surrogates do not exercise this right, intended parent(s) will be responsible for the
children.460 However, allowing the surrogate to choose to keep the child creates significant uncertainties
for the intended parent(s). Moreover, it arguably undermines the foundation of the surrogacy
arrangement, which treats the surrogate as performing a service by carrying a child that belongs to the
intended parent(s), not as having her own child and then transferring it to them.
Citizenship laws are critical to protecting the rights of children, and complications around citizenship are
particularly salient to circumstances in which children are born through ART processes, including
surrogacy. Citizenship laws must be adjusted to address this advance in medical technology that has made
it possible for a child to be birthed by the citizen of one country but genetically linked to the citizen of one
or two other countries.461 The UDHR protects a child’s right to a nationality, as well as the right not to be
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arbitrarily deprived of nationality.462 Where a child born through surrogacy is not a citizen of the intended
parent(s)’s country, the child could be left stateless if the surrogacy country does not recognize its
citizenship either, possibly stranding the child in the supplying country.463 Thus, regulations of surrogacy
must take into account whether citizenship will be granted to children born through surrogacy and in what
form, a consideration that may interact with the parentage laws discussed above. If citizenship will not be
granted, regulation must ensure the child’s right to citizenship is not violated and consider how to ensure
that the receiving country will grant citizenship. This consideration is important for surrogacy
arrangements that go smoothly, where the child is taken in by the intended parent(s), and also for
surrogacy arrangements where problems arise. Regulations must be in place to address the possibility of
child abandonment, and whether the child will be granted citizenship in that place. If a country seeks to
prevent abandonment by requiring intended parent(s) to assume parental obligations regardless of
whether they want to keep the child, as is a common feature of surrogacy legislation,464 it must consider
how such a rule would be enforced, especially in an international context.
In sum, to protect the rights of all parties, surrogacy policy must ensure that surrogates will not be treated
as legal parents against their will; intended parent(s) will not be deprived of parental rights unless those
rights are curtailed to protect the rights of surrogates or children; and children born through surrogacy
will ultimately have a nationality and a party responsible for their well-being.
b)
R IGHTS -P ROTECTIVE L AWS AND P OLICIES
The existing legal and policy framework for rights protection will serve as a foundation for a rightsprotective approach to surrogacy. Where such laws and policies are already in place, they may already
provide a degree of protection for parties in surrogacy arrangements as long as they are fully incorporated
into the surrogacy context. Surrogacy regulation should therefore account for existing rights-protective
laws and policies, both to determine the extent that additional protections are required and to ensure
that existing protections are properly applied to surrogacy. Though there are innumerable rightsprotective laws and policies that might be relevant to surrogacy, this section will consider some of the
existing laws and policy considerations that are likely to be especially salient. To some extent, these
categories mirror internationally recognized rights discussed in Part II.
(1)
L ABOR
Many policy and legal systems already include various protections for workers’ rights. These may include
minimum wage laws, limitations on working hours, or a protected right to unionize.465 Surrogacy involves
labor, including the labor of becoming pregnant (which usually includes hormone treatments and the IVF
process), being pregnant (including compliance with medical requirements and restrictions on activity,
food consumption and travel), 466 giving birth to a child (often done by cesarean section in surrogacy
contexts), and experiencing the varying and unanticipated physical and psychological side effects often
involved in the various stages of pregnancy and childbirth. If surrogacy is acknowledged as labor, existing
labor laws should provide protection for surrogates. To ensure that this happens, it may be useful to
expressly incorporate labor laws into surrogacy legislation.
Even where existing labor laws and policies are determined not to directly apply to surrogacy, they may
offer a guide as to what degree of protection is appropriate. For example, laws setting minimum wages
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or maximum working hours may not translate directly to the surrogacy context, where women are
essentially performing ongoing labor for a defined period of time, at least for the duration of their
pregnancies. Yet such laws establish standards with respect to the value of a person’s time and the
amount of that time that an employer can reasonably demand. Surrogacy regulations, to be consistent
with existing rights frameworks, should comply with those standards. For instance, requiring a surrogate
to live in a communal home,467 such that she may not be able to see her family for the duration of the
process, may be difficult to reconcile with legal frameworks that limit a workweek to forty hours, or
mandate certain amounts of vacation time. Surrogacy regulations could prohibit such strict requirements,
or could at least establish protections to ensure that surrogates have a reasonable amount of freedom
and are fully compensated for the unique burdens that surrogacy imposes.
Moreover, surrogacy, like other forms of labor, can have unanticipated after-effects that do not become
evident until after the child is birthed. Serious conditions that may not emerge until after birth include
postpartum hemorrhaging, deep vein thrombosis, postpartum preeclampsia, pulmonary embolism,
postpartum depression, postpartum thyroiditis, and heart disease. 468 Some of these can be lifethreatening, and surrogates may not show symptoms until months after birth. 469 Labor laws should
consider how to protect surrogates against unanticipated medical costs associated with and following the
pregnancy. Though intended parent(s) and surrogacy agencies can simply be required to pay any
surrogacy-related health costs, even after the surrogacy arrangement is complete, it may also be helpful
to incorporate surrogacy into existing social security or social insurance programs designed to cover health
care related costs arising from occupational health risks. As surrogacy involves specific medical procedures
that may entail particular sorts of risk, surrogacy-specific health codes could be implemented, as is
sometimes done for particularly hazardous industries. The International Labour Organization, for
instance, has published a series of Codes of Practice and Guides on Occupational Health for various types
of work including forestry, work in underground coalmines, and work in non-ferrous metals industries.470
For countries that implement codes of this sort, or that otherwise set minimum health and safety
standards and provide for health care coverage for workers, it will be useful to consider how a similar
framework might be adapted to surrogacy. Instead of simply requiring surrogacy contracts to provide for
health care costs, such frameworks—which might, for instance, require surrogacy intermediaries to
contribute to a government-backed health insurance system—could provide more comprehensive and
reliable security.
(2)
N ON -D ISCRIMINATION AND W OMEN ’ S E QUALITY
Laws and policies prohibiting gender discrimination and promoting women’s equality are critical to
addressing surrogacy in a human-rights focused manner. Since only women can become pregnant,
restrictions or prohibitions of individuals from serving as surrogates essentially restrict the rights of
women alone. CEDAW requires that countries not discriminate against women in their laws and policies,
including restrictions or regulations of women’s choices of labor and reproductive choices and activities.471
In addition, the ECHR and the ICCPR also require states to ensure non-discrimination in the context of laws
and policies around reproductive rights and choices.472 This obligation includes ensuring laws and policies
on reproductive choices are not based on gender stereotypes such as traditional conceptions of
motherhood and maternity.473 As a result, a country’s anti-discrimination laws must guide any laws and
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policies on surrogacy that restrict the practice due to traditional ideas that maternity cannot be treated
as valued labor. Policymakers must be able to show strong justifications for the restrictions, such as
evidence that they are essential to protecting rights of other parties that outweigh women’s rights to be
free from discrimination.

Many of women’s work-related accidents
are not recorded as occupational, not
compensated by work insurance systems
and not included in thinking about
occupational health.

Similarly, where surrogates are
inadequately protected from exploitation,
women are uniquely placed at risk. Thus,
any discrepancy between protections
available in other contexts—such as labor
laws that protect other employees—and
protections available to surrogates could
be viewed as discriminatory to the extent that they leave surrogates more vulnerable than other
workers. As discussed above, gendered divisions of labor already deprive women of economic
opportunities and devalue the domestic work they perform.474 Because their labor is often undervalued,
they may also be deprived of equal health and safety benefits. Even when they perform work in the
formal economy, their injuries and illnesses are often underdiagnosed, they are more frequently denied
compensation than men, and they are often provided more limited treatments.475 When their work is
not fully acknowledged as such, the disparity is even worse. As the WHO stated in a 2006 report:
[W]omen’s work in many countries is still performed in the domestic sphere and in the
informal economy, and is thus invisible in the public, economic, and institutional sphere.
As a result, many of women’s work-related accidents and diseases are not recorded as
occupational, not compensated by work insurance systems and not included in thinking
about occupational health.476
This existing disparity suggests that work performed by women, including surrogacy, is at risk of being
undervalued and under-protected. Thoughtful surrogacy policies, however, can ensure that surrogates
are offered protection akin to that provided to men in occupations that also carry unique health risks. In
sum, while antidiscrimination laws may not absolutely require certain levels of protection, they
nonetheless set a standard of gender equality that surrogacy regulations should meet.
(3)
R EPRODUCTIVE R IGHTS
As discussed in Part II, state signatories to the CEDAW and other human rights treaties have committed
to protecting reproductive rights and choices.477 This includes the right of individuals to decide when and
how to have children or start a family, and it requires access to minimum standards of reproductive and
maternal health care.478 Laws and policies domesticating these obligations will impact surrogate women.
For example, respect for these rights might require certain minimum protections for surrogates, such as
the right to have or refuse an abortion without incurring prohibitive penalties, or the right to receive
adequate pre- and postnatal care. Relevant laws may also establish a right to start a family or access
reproductive technology; such laws would be relevant to intended parent(s). More generally,
reproductive rights require regulations of surrogacy to not be overly restrictive unless truly necessary to
protect other parties’ rights.
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Almost all countries also provide some form of maternity protection, which is “a fundamental labour right
enshrined in key universal human rights treaties.” 479 For instance, a 2013 report by the International
Labour Organization compared the legal provisions of one hundred and eighty-five countries. It found that
ninety-eight of those countries provide at least fourteen weeks of maternity leave,480 and one hundred
and eighty-three of those countries provided some form of cash benefit to women during maternity
leave, 481 just to name a few common provisions. While surrogacy is arguably different than other
pregnancies, the values inherent in these laws suggest that they ought to extend to surrogate pregnancies
as well. Though a surrogate is being paid for her labor, unlike women who are carrying children they intend
to raise themselves, she is still exercising her basic right to carry and give birth to a child, and is performing
a valuable service to others who similarly want to fulfill their basic right to form a family. Accordingly, the
same respect for the value of carrying children and forming families that underlies legal protections for
pregnant women and new parents ought to extend to surrogates and intended parent(s) as well.
Variations might be appropriate—for instance, intended parent(s) will not require the same protections
during pregnancy, and surrogates may not require the same amount of time off after birth—but the value
of maternal and parental activities expressed in existing law should not be discounted in the surrogacy
context.
(4)
P ROTECTIONS OF THE R IGHTS OF C HILDREN
Countries are also obligated to protect the rights of children under various international treaties.482 This
includes ensuring the best interests of the child in laws and policies that affect children.483 It also expressly
includes the right of children to be free from discrimination based on the circumstances of their birth,
meaning that they cannot be denied citizenship or other rights as a result of those circumstances.484 Most
countries have accordingly enacted laws and policies to protect the rights of children, and surrogacy
regulations should be consistent with these laws. For instance, laws protecting the best interests of
children generally, or the rights of children to nationality or citizenship, would require surrogacy policy
and regulations to ensure children will not be left orphaned or stateless, as discussed above.485 In addition,
a child-protective approach may require a minimum standard of care for children and that children are
not taken from intended parent(s)—even where the surrogacy arrangement is unlawful—where such a
response would not be in the child’s best interest. Laws protecting children from exploitation may also
require that intended parent(s) are adequately vetted before gaining custody. 486 Laws surrounding
adoption may offer guidance as to the degree of vetting necessary. For instance, some jurisdictions have
expressly required that intended parent(s) meet the standard set for adoptive parents.487
(5)
M EDICAL L AWS AND P OLICIES
The right to the highest attainable standard of health, including reproductive and maternal health care, is
expressed in Article 25 UDHR and Article 12 ICESCR.488 Laws and policies implementing this obligation,
that establish certain standards of medical care, apply in surrogacy contexts as well. Surrogates should
have access to the same level of medical care as is required in other contexts, and privately-operated
surrogacy facilities should meet requirements set for other health care facilities. In addition, laws may
protect the rights of patients to make their own medical decisions, and this may restrict the ability of
intended parent(s) to dictate a surrogate’s medical choices. Indeed, protections of autonomy and
informed consent, especially in facilities operated by the surrogacy industry, are likely to be especially
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salient. Even though surrogacy may involve more parties with potentially conflicting interests than in
other medical contexts, surrogates’ fundamental right to bodily integrity and autonomy should not be
curtailed. Surrogacy regulations should therefore ensure that medical care in the surrogacy context meets
standards established elsewhere, and that surrogacy contracts are not drafted or enforced in a manner
that would undermine those standards. This is especially true for health facilities privately operated by
surrogacy intermediaries, as have generally been used in South and Southeast Asian surrogacy
arrangements, including the ones we researched in Cambodia.489 Under human rights instruments such
as CEDAW and CESCR, states have an obligation not only to refrain from certain rights violations, but also
to ensure that private actors are upholding certain rights standards. States have violated CEDAW, for
instance, by failing to ensure adequate health care was provided to women at private hospitals. 490
Accordingly, the general quality of health facilities run by surrogacy intermediaries should live up to the
standards that apply elsewhere and should be regulated to ensure that surrogate interests are not
subordinated to the interests of the intended parent(s) or the fetus. Because the competing interests in
the surrogacy context are unusual, especially where contractual provisions purport to deprive surrogates
of control of their medical choices,491 new protections may be necessary to curb bias and ensure that
surrogates’ health is prioritized.
(6)
R EGULATION OF R EPRODUCTIVE T ECHNOLOGIES
Many jurisdictions already have laws addressing other reproductive technologies such as egg donation,
sperm donation, and IVF. While there are no international obligations to provide access to reproductive
technology, as discussed, various human rights are implicated in the restriction, limitations and regulation
of this technology.492 Regulations addressing surrogacy should be developed with reference to regulation
of all ART to ensure consistency, and should attempt, to whatever extent possible, to facilitate the right
to benefit from scientific progress.
In fact, many of the concerns raised with respect to surrogacy are present to some extent with respect to
other reproductive technologies. For instance, egg and sperm donation both involve the sale of a person’s
reproductive abilities, so prohibiting surrogacy for this reason without similarly prohibiting egg or sperm
donation creates inconsistencies with a potential discriminatory impact. In addition, children born
through egg or sperm donation may have no genetic link to the parents who raise them, such that it may
be inconsistent to allow these technologies to facilitate parenthood but to prohibit surrogacy in the
absence of a genetic link. Both surrogacy regulations and the reasons guiding them should be situated
within and reconciled with the broader context of reproductive technology laws.
Moreover, care should be taken to ensure surrogacy regulations are not employed to unnecessarily
restrict ART technologies. Article 8 of Cambodia’s draft surrogacy law, for instance, contains detailed
provisions on the use of human embryos generally, which means this provision will regulate IVF practices
outside of the surrogacy context as well.493 Such a provision, if intended to restrict surrogacy specifically,
could have the unintended result of unduly restricting access to other forms of ART. Such access, as
discussed above, facilitates the right to found a family and provides opportunities for individuals in
marginalized communities to parent who were previously unable to do so.
(7)

P ROHIBITIONS A GAINST F ORCED L ABOR AND H UMAN T RAFFICKING
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While surrogacy does not inherently violate forced labor and human trafficking prohibitions, its practice
should be regulated to ensure that it complies with such laws and upholds international principles.494 For
instance, as explained above, contractual clauses that effectively force surrogates to stay in arrangements
they wish to leave may amount to forced labor, and may violate the principle that people should always
be free to abandon undesirable work. Though surrogates may be required to pay some form of
compensation if they breach their agreements, this compensation should not effectively prohibit them
from breach.495 Some jurisdictions, to avoid such abuses, have incorporated this principle into surrogacy
law by guaranteeing that surrogates may abandon their arrangements without penalty under some
circumstances.496 With regard to human trafficking, it may also be beneficial to protect surrogates from
undue restrictions on their movement. For instance, regulations might prohibit intermediaries from taking
surrogates’ passports when surrogates are recruited from other countries. 497 Infants must also be
protected from trafficking, though this can be accomplished by ensuring that intended parent(s) are
adequately vetted as discussed above.498
At the same time, prohibitions that address human trafficking may be mistakenly applied to surrogacy
arrangements that do not constitute human trafficking. Such prohibitions may need to be amended
accordingly. As described above, the surrogates arrested in Cambodia were prosecuted for human
trafficking.499 But as discussed in Part II, surrogacy is not human trafficking. Human trafficking requires
some form of coercion or force that exacts labor, 500 so surrogates are not trafficked as long as they
voluntarily engage in surrogacy. And, as a proper understanding of the science and medical technology
involved in surrogacy makes clear, surrogacy for a legitimate intended parent does not constitute
trafficking of children. 501 Similarly, laws prohibiting the sale of children might be read to prohibit
surrogacy, but the principles and policy motivations underlying such laws do not apply to the surrogacy
context. Moreover, where surrogacy is understood as the service of carrying a child that belongs to the
intended parent(s), it does not entail the sale of a child because the intended parent(s) have parental
rights to the child from the beginning.502 Laws prohibiting sale of children must therefore be interpreted,
and if necessary revised, in light of a proper understanding of the medical and legal process of surrogacy.
Laws that may unintentionally impact surrogacy, or create uncertainty as to surrogacy’s legality, including
those relating to human trafficking and exploitation of children, need clarification and proper legal
definitions in order to harmonize them with the practice of surrogacy in light of the rights and benefits it
advances.
c)
L AWS REGARDING CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
Apart from the question of whether surrogacy should be restricted or limited, countries that do choose
to restrict surrogacy and assign criminal or civil penalties to those in violation must be mindful of the
human rights implications of those penalties. Where surrogacy prohibitions are violated, penalties can
unnecessarily or unintentionally harm all parties involved. For instance, as shown in examples discussed
above,503 the choice to prohibit surrogacy often leads states to deny parentage to intended parent(s) and
to deny citizenship to children, potentially leaving children orphaned or stateless. The rights of children
would be better served by recognizing parentage of intended parent(s) to the extent that it is in the child’s
best interest, granting citizenship accordingly, and penalizing parties that violate the law through other
means, such imposing fines or other sanctions on intended parent(s) or other parties.
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Surrogates may similarly be unnecessarily injured by the enforcement of bans or other restrictions. In
Cambodia, surrogates were prosecuted as human traffickers of infants. 504 But surrogates are often
members of vulnerable populations and may not be aware of existing laws. 505 Moreover, prosecuting
surrogates as criminals is unlikely to be the most effective way to deter surrogacy. Authors’ factual
investigation revealed that the surrogates arrested for child trafficking in Cambodia did not realize they
were breaking the law—they believed they were merely providing the service of bearing a child for a third
party—which means the prohibition could not have deterred them.506 Moreover, since there is already a
risk that surrogates will be pressured into surrogacy, or engage in surrogacy under exploitative conditions,
laws penalizing surrogates may exacerbate the exploitation of women. Given these considerations,
surrogacy operations that violate the law would better promote human rights if they focused on
penalizing surrogacy intermediaries.
In sum, where laws are implemented or applied so as to enforce a surrogacy ban or restriction, it is
important that they do not injure vulnerable or innocent parties in the process.

2.

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO ENFORCE LAW

Regulation of surrogacy requires effective enforcement. As a result, the strength of the rule of law in each
country is an important consideration. For the purpose of this discussion, this report will draw on the
definition of rule of law provided by the World Justice Project, which releases a comprehensive Rule of
Law report annually, most recently in 2016.507 The report defines rule of law as a system in which four
principles are upheld: individuals as well as government and private actors are accountable under the law;
laws are “clear, publicized, stable and just,” “applied evenly,” and “protective of fundamental rights”; laws
are enacted, administered, and enforced in a manner that is “accessible, fair, and efficient”; and “[j]ustice
is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals who are of
sufficient number, have adequate resources and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.”508
Rule of law is important for surrogacy because where rule of law is weak, regulations intended to protect
parties’ rights may be ineffective or applied unevenly, whether due to impunity for wealthy actors,
government corruption, discriminatory enforcement, ineffective administration of justice by underresourced institutions, or any other such impediment. Surrogacy policies can be responsive to failings in
a country’s rule of law in several ways. First, effective enforcement mechanisms should be identified in
domestic law and institutions regulating surrogacy. Where these mechanisms are strong, direction and
proscriptions on surrogacy regulations may be more relaxed, allowing increased party autonomy. For
example, a study conducted at Cornell Law School compared unregulated surrogacy practices in the
United States and India.509 The study found that despite the lack of surrogacy legislation, surrogates in the
United States generally enjoyed a number of protections, including independent legal representation paid
for by intended parent(s), freedom to choose their own health care providers, and health and life
insurance paid for by intended parent(s) if they did not already have it.510 The study concluded that these
benefits may be the result of the strong common law system in the United States, which effectively
protects surrogates from many abuses and therefore motivates the surrogacy industry to adopt surrogateprotective practices.511 In India, where the common law system is less effective, surrogates did not have
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any of those protections, and in many cases their contracts also failed to address important issues such
as compensation altogether.512
This illustration demonstrates that very different mechanisms may be necessary to attain the same level
of protection in different contexts. Where existing mechanisms are weak, regulations may need to be
stricter, sacrificing a degree of flexibility for the parties involved in order to ensure that rights are
protected. For example, if regulatory bodies lack the institutional capacity to actively monitor the
surrogacy industry, it may be better to require that all surrogacy contracts are pre-approved, even though
this imposes additional burdens for the parties to the contract. In cases where domestic mechanisms are
wholly inadequate—meaning that protection cannot be effectively guaranteed by any domestic
institution, whether it be the judiciary, a regulatory agency, or any other body—international sources of
regulation should be considered. International bodies or other countries involved in the surrogacy
industry might provide additional enforcement mechanisms, such as a mediation mechanism
implemented by an international body.513 Parties could also be required to agree to a private arbitration
mechanism.514

Surrogacy practices have emerged in
countries where the rule of law faces
serious obstacles.

Surrogacy practices have emerged in
countries where the rule of law faces
serious obstacles. The WJP Report ranks
countries based on government
strength, corruption, transparency,
fundamental rights, order and security,
regulatory enforcement, civil justice, criminal justice, and informal justice.515 These factors are all relevant
to how well surrogacy can be regulated. For instance, corruption may enable powerful parties to exploit
weaker ones, while a powerful civil justice system may provide redress for injured parties. Countries with
low rule of law scores where surrogacy has arisen include Ukraine, Mexico, Russia, Guatemala, Kenya,
Nigeria, and Cambodia.516 Many of these countries also show problems in specific areas relevant to the
enforcement of surrogacy laws. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
2017, for instance, Laos, Kenya, and Guatemala, three countries with currently emerging surrogacy
markets, are all considered “highly corrupt.”517 With regard to regulatory enforcement, perhaps the most
salient factor for surrogacy, India, Mexico, Cambodia, Russia, Guatemala, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ukraine all
rank seventy-first or lower out of one hundred and thirteen ranked countries in the WJP Report.518
Judiciary competence is also a particularly important factor. Absent the development of a parallel
administrative or international mechanism, the judiciary is critical to ensuring surrogacy arrangements
are just and enforceable. A written contract is necessary to properly protect the parties to a surrogacy
arrangement, unless detailed regulations set all terms of surrogacy arrangements. Even then, a written
agreement is likely necessary to ensure that all parties fully understand their rights and obligations.
Typically, courts are the venue in which contract terms are enforced. They are therefore critical to
ensuring surrogacy arrangements provide and uphold fair terms unless a viable alternative venue is
identified, such as a special body tasked with overseeing surrogacy disputes. Even if key protections come
from statutes or administrative regulations rather than contracts, courts are often key to holding parties
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responsible for violations, whether civil or criminal. As a result, protections designed to protect surrogates
and children, regardless of how they are established, may only be as strong as a state’s judiciary.
Unfortunately, some countries with current or recent surrogacy markets are lacking in terms of judicial
independence and efficacy of courts. In a 2018 report by the World Economic Forum based on a survey
of business leaders, for instance, Ukraine, Mexico, and Cambodia were among the lowest-ranked
countries in the world for judicial independence. 519 According to the WJP Report, civil justice is also
extremely weak in countries such as Nepal, Guatemala, Cambodia, Kenya, India, and Mexico.520 These
countries fare similarly in terms of criminal justice.521
In countries where such obstacles to effective regulation exist, surrogacy policy should reflect the reality
of those obstacles. For instance, where it is difficult for vulnerable members of a population to seek
redress for their injuries, either through civil or criminal justice systems, it may be beneficial for
governments to take initiative in monitoring and policing the surrogacy industry even where no violations
have yet been reported. Similarly, where weak institutions are unlikely to redress injuries after the fact, a
possible solution is to regulate surrogacy ex ante. For example, some jurisdictions require every surrogacy
arrangement to be approved by a government official beforehand.522 Alternatively, surrogacy could be
limited to licensed agencies that must be approved by the government before they begin practicing. If the
government would benefit from additional protection beyond what is available domestically, it could
identify a third party, such an international institution, capable of providing additional enforcement. This
could be particularly helpful where there is extensive government corruption that could undermine the
reliability of government oversight.
As with banning surrogacy, however, restrictions on surrogacy also constrain the rights of the parties
involved. Administrative obstacles may reduce the availability of surrogacy, depriving some women of the
opportunity to become surrogates, or increase surrogacy costs such that surrogates receive less
compensation. Accordingly, restrictions should only be implemented to the extent necessary. For
instance, requiring all surrogacy practices to be approved in advance is burdensome, and may unduly
restrict party rights in places where wrongdoing is already deterred by strong civil courts.

3.

HEALTH CARE

Another major factor in ensuring surrogacy is practiced in a rights-protective manner is the country’s
health care system. As discussed above, to a certain extent surrogacy is no more dangerous than many
other forms of labor, including factory work and agricultural labor.523 While surrogates may be financially
pressured into serving as surrogates for inadequate compensation,524 this is also the case for many other
forms of labor where power imbalances exist and economic need is paramount. 525 However, because
surrogacy involves pregnancy, the medical risks of pregnancy accompany the process and pose particular
risks to surrogates and children born through surrogacy. The health care system and its ability to provide
for prenatal and maternal care is therefore extremely important to ensuring surrogacy is practiced in a
safe manner.
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Both access to health care and quality of health care are important and may be lacking in some countries
with current or former surrogacy markets. According to overall health care efficiency rankings by the WHO
in 2000, current and former surrogacy countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Laos and Cambodia are in the
bottom thirty of one hundred and ninety-one ranked countries.526 Mortality rates of mothers and infants
are of particular interest. In Cambodia, the maternal death rate as of 2015 was approximately one
hundred and sixty-one deaths per one-hundred-thousand live births,527 while the 2018 infant mortality
rate was twenty-five deaths per one thousand live births.528 In addition, inadequate health care before,
during, and after pregnancy can pose additional health risks to mothers and children.
One solution to inadequate health care systems is for surrogacy intermediaries to provide surrogates and
children with better health care than is generally available in the country, but this may not ensure
surrogates are fully protected. For instance, not only will surrogates require adequate health care
throughout the surrogacy process, but they may also need additional health care if they experience
medical complications post-birth. This could be a problem if surrogates no longer have access to surrogacy
clinics, especially if the standard health care they have access to is inadequate. In Cambodia, for example,
most surrogates were from rural regions, where health care was severely limited.529 Furthermore, health
care provided by private actors such as surrogacy intermediaries may not be regulated, which could leave
surrogates vulnerable, especially where their best interests do not align with intended parent(s)’. 530
However, these problems may be remedied by law or external institutions. Regulations could require that
surrogacy agencies guarantee a minimum level of protection for surrogates, including protection for postbirth complications, either by assuming direct liability for that health care or by providing surrogates with
some form of health insurance. As discussed above, surrogates could also enjoy benefits of governmentsponsored worker compensation or social security programs.531 Regulation could also set standards of
practice for surrogacy clinics and assign a regulatory body the task of inspecting the clinics to ensure
compliance. Finally, a separate third-party mechanism could provide health care for surrogates by way of
private sector cooperation or government agreements. This is not an exhaustive list of solutions, but it
illustrates that where health care quality in a country is inadequate, alternative mechanisms might provide
additional protection for surrogates’ health.
4.

SOCIETAL CONSIDERATIONS

Social factors may also be relevant to surrogacy policy. Issues such as stigmatization in the community or
pressure on women to sacrifice their interests for others may change the way surrogacy is experienced or
practiced; poor economic conditions may increase pressure on women to enter surrogacy; and education
levels may influence how vulnerable women are to entering agreements they do not fully understand. As
explained elsewhere, gender discrimination and traditional views towards women’s maternal and
reproductive roles often underpin social stigma.532 Efforts to regulate surrogacy should mitigate stigma
and other social harms where possible and seek to ensure that surrogates’ voices are heard so that their
views and interests are understood and protected.
Additionally, regulation should reflect the fact that societal factors can undermine informed consent.533
For surrogacy to be implemented in a rights-promoting manner, surrogates must be able to fully
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understand the surrogacy process and freely agree to it. If women are pressured to enter surrogacy
agreements, or are not provided adequate information to fully understand their contracts, they may not
be providing informed consent. At the same time, where social factors make surrogacy especially costly—
for instance, by stigmatizing women who act as surrogates—the injury that results from surrogacy
arrangements entered without informed consent is greater. Where informed consent can be assured,
surrogates may willingly incur these costs of surrogacy, but where informed consent is lacking, any costs
to the surrogate may amount to injuries against her and so additional protections must be put in place.
Importantly, though these societal considerations should be recognized and addressed, they should not
be seen as excuses to undermine the freedom of women to make their own choices. Concerns such as
social mores, gender inequality, or low levels of education could easily be used to justify laws that restrict
women’s autonomy, supposedly for women’s benefit. But as discussed above, the rights of women are
global and uniform: context-specific factors that pose obstacles to the fulfillment of human rights may
justify variations in regulatory approaches, but they should be aimed at the same goal of enabling women
to make autonomous choices about what they do with their bodies and labor. In a context where the risk
of certain rights violations is particularly high, an appropriate approach to protecting surrogates and
children may more closely regulate the practice of surrogacy as compared to other contexts where risks
are lower. However, these regulations should only be implemented as necessary to address legitimate
risks, and they should aim to facilitate women’s freedom rather than limit it. For instance, a requirement
that all surrogacy arrangements be preapproved by a government official may be appropriate where risks
are high that women will not be adequately informed of surrogacy risks but must also account for other
ways such a policy could restrict or hamper women’s rights such as state capacity, accessibility and
corruption.
[T]he rights of women are global and uniform: context-specific factors
that pose obstacles to the fulfillment of human rights may justify
variations in regulatory approaches, but they should be aimed at the
same goal of enabling women to make autonomous choices about what
they do with their bodies and labor.
Additionally, where societal factors create human rights risks for surrogacy, the state has an obligation to
address these underlying problems rather than merely restrict women’s rights to compensate for its
failure to do so. For instance, states are obligated under CEDAW and other rights instruments to address
gender inequality. While surrogacy regulation should not be blind to existing gender inequality, states
should not merely reflect this inequality in surrogacy regulation but should also make broader efforts to
combat the inequality itself. Accordingly, where regulations aimed at protecting women in light of gender
inequality have the effect of restricting surrogacy to some degree, such regulations should be seen only
as a temporary measure while states work to alleviate the underlying inequality.
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a)
S OCIAL M ORES
While some have speculated that surrogacy has the potential to cause psychological harm to the surrogate
or child born through surrogacy, studies are inconclusive and the impact of surrogacy appears to vary
greatly depending on context. The social mores of a surrogate’s community are likely to be important. As
discussed earlier, in studies conducted in the United States and United Kingdom, for instance, surrogates
have not shown much psychological distress at giving the baby to the intended parent(s).534 By contrast,
in India, where there is a stronger cultural norm of considering the birthmother to be the child’s true
mother, surrogates have expressed more emotional distress at giving the child to the intended
parent(s).535 Similarly, a surrogate may experience varying levels of stigma or shame depending on the
social mores of her community. Indeed, some segments of a culture may view surrogates as unchaste, or
consider them to be selling their children.536
As discussed above, these cultural assumptions and mores impact many issues related to women’s rights
and autonomy and are often based on issues broader than the surrogacy context related to gender
stereotyping and maternity. In the context of surrogacy, as with other issues around women’s equality
and non-discrimination, states have an obligation to address underlying cultural assumptions, such as
gender stereotypes, that impede women’s progress and de facto equality. However, to the extent these
issues implicate surrogacy, surrogacy regulation could also attempt to mitigate some of surrogacy’s social
costs. Of course, these cultural contexts are complex: there may not be any single cultural view of
surrogacy, and states should always be cautious about policies that reflect majority views and impact
minority rights. The voices of surrogates and other parties should be central to informing a state’s
consideration of cultural factors. States could take affirmative steps towards addressing harmful social
mores such as educating the public about the surrogacy process to dispel misconceptions that surrogacy
involves sexual behavior or the sale of one’s own child. Alternatively, surrogacy intermediaries could be
required to conduct similar education initiatives. In another example, during the surrogacy process, it may
be particularly important for surrogates facing social stigma, or otherwise subject to social mores that
may make surrogacy psychologically difficult, to undergo psychological screening 537 and receive
counselling during and after the process. Surrogacy policy may also want to consider how legal framing
could interact with social perceptions of surrogacy. For instance, structuring surrogacy as adoption by the
intended parent(s) may reinforce the idea that the surrogate is giving up her own child, whereas vesting
parental rights and obligations in the intended parent(s) from the start reflects the fact that she is merely
performing a service by carrying a child that does not belong to her.
At the same time, regulation should recognize that where a given cultural context makes the surrogacy
process inaccessible or otherwise emotionally difficult, it is all the more important that surrogates receive
the necessary support to fully understand the process. It may be appropriate for regulations to ensure a
surrogate receives sufficient information and opportunities for consultation about the process in cultural
contexts that view surrogacy in a negative manner. Of course, any additional assistance should not be
aimed at discouraging the surrogate but providing her with information necessary to make an informed
decision. Other ways to do so could include: case-by-case approval of surrogacy arrangements, a
requirement that surrogates be provided with independent counsel, or a requirement that surrogates
receive copies of contracts in their native languages. Informed consent and social stigma can be
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addressed in a manner that does not unduly restrict the freedom of adult women to make their own
choices.
b)
G ENDER I NEQUALITY
As discussed in previous sections, gender inequality also permeates concerns related to surrogacy. Gender
inequality remains high throughout the world, impacting the lives of women and girls in innumerable
ways. Women often have access to fewer opportunities for lower rates of pay,538 making surrogacy a more
desirable option. They are usually underrepresented in government and other positions of power, 539
raising concerns about whether women’s rights will be prioritized and fully protected. As has been
documented, women often face extreme pressure to subordinate their desires to those of their husbands
or families. Some have argued that this casts doubt on whether they are able to make autonomous
choices.540 In addition, women often have fewer educational opportunities than men,541 leaving them
more vulnerable to exploitation. Gender based violence also remains prevalent in many countries,542 such
that isolating women in surrogacy hostels tightly controlled by private actors543 could create opportunities
for abuse. The ways gender inequality manifests in society are innumerable, but in brief, this inequality
often leaves women in a more vulnerable position. And gender inequality is particularly high in some
countries with current or former surrogacy industries. Countries including Nepal, Guatemala, India, and
Cambodia, for instance, rank on the lower end of gender equality according to the World Economic
Forum’s 2017 Global Gender Gap Report.544
Gender inequality is certainly an important factor in determining whether surrogacy can be implemented
in a manner that respects women’s human rights. However, as with other surrogacy concerns, the risks
associated with gender inequality are not particular to surrogacy, but instead present in many aspects of
society.545 Moreover, any risk that surrogacy could leave women vulnerable to abuse must be weighed
against the fact that restricting surrogacy aggravates gender inequality by depriving women of a source
of economic empowerment and dictating how they are permitted to use their bodies. Such restrictions
may reinforce ideas that women who use their sexual or reproductive capacities in certain ways are
immoral, and that these capacities should therefore be controlled. In addition, in jurisdictions where only
altruistic surrogacy is permitted, women may be pressured to perform difficult labor without
compensation, encouraging the view that women’s labor is not valuable or is only worthy when offered
for “altruistic” rather than financial reasons.
Accordingly, women’s equality is best promoted by a policy that allows women to choose the terms under
which they offer their labor—including paid surrogacy if they so choose—but provides them protection
from any human rights abuses. This may mean stricter protections in cultures where women are more
vulnerable. It may also be helpful to ensure that the actors responsible for enforcing regulations are
educated on gender issues and trained to respect women’s rights. Since gender inequality could
undermine informed consent where women are expected to submit to the decisions of others, added
protections to promote informed consent may also help mitigate the risks created by gender equality. For
instance, regulation could require that women consent to surrogacy in a private setting, without male
relatives present, and that this consent be verified by an official trained in gender issues. In sum, though
there is no particular formula for eliminating the power imbalances caused by gender equality, policies
that are conscious of this inequality have many tools to ameliorate it.
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c)
E DUCATION
Finally, a country’s educational systems are relevant to how surrogacy is best regulated. Some countries
with current or former surrogacy industries have low rates of education. For instance, according to the
UN’s 2016 Education Index, countries including Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Guatemala, and Kenya all rank
one hundred and twenty-seventh or lower out of one hundred and eighty-nine ranked countries with
regard to education levels.546
Where women are less educated, greater protection may be necessary to guarantee informed consent.
Informed consent requires surrogates to understand the nature of the surrogacy process, the health risks
involved, and their legal rights. They agree to undergo complex medical procedures that most laypeople
do not understand: they must undergo an IVF implantation process, receive hormone injections for
extended periods of time, and often give birth through caesarian sections. Not only are these procedures
complex, they have important medical and moral implications. Caesarian sections, for example, carry risks
including infection, blood clots, and risks to future pregnancies,547 yet many surrogates do not realize they
will undergo a caesarian section when they agree to surrogacy. 548 Surrogacy can also involve a “fetal
reduction” process whereby unwanted multiple pregnancies are terminated, though many surrogates are
similarly unaware of this process beforehand.549 This has been an especially disturbing problem in cases
where surrogates are morally opposed to abortion.550
Legal aspects of surrogacy are similarly complicated and important. Surrogates should fully understand
the terms of their contract, including all of their rights and obligations. They should know, for example,
how much compensation they will receive if they have a miscarriage, what their rights are with respect to
medical decisions, and whether they will be covered if unexpected medical complications arise, just to
name a few important provisions. As discussed above, surrogates in many countries have demonstrated
little to no knowledge of their contract terms.551 Even where they have access to the contracts—which is
not always the case552—the contracts may be difficult for lay persons to understand without legal counsel,
and many surrogates may not be literate.553
Because the scientific and legal aspects of surrogacy can have important medical, financial, and
psychological implications for surrogates, it is vital that anyone entering a surrogacy agreement
completely understands what it entails. While women without high levels of education are perfectly
capable of understanding surrogacy, they may be more vulnerable to intermediaries who attempt to
withhold important information or otherwise mislead them. As the surrogacy industry may want to
downplay risks and encourage women to become surrogates, an uneducated population may require a
larger degree of protection. This is especially true given that surrogates are likely to be recruited from less
educated segments of the population. In sum, a government must consider how vulnerable surrogates
are to misinformation about surrogacy—including complex medical and legal aspects of it—as well as
whether and how the law might help to promote understanding. Extra protections of informed consent
might be required, such as case-by-case approval by a government official who must disclose all relevant
information to the surrogate and confirm that she understands. Government efforts to educate the public
generally may also reduce the risk that surrogates will be misinformed.
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In addition, education within a country impacts public understanding of surrogacy. Even the basic idea of
surrogacy—that the surrogate is carrying a baby with no genetic link to her—is widely misunderstood by
many people, and the level of understanding varies in different communities. As discussed above, some
people assume that surrogates have sex with intended fathers or sell their own biological children, leading
to stigma against surrogate women and their families. 554 Where education is limited, these
misperceptions may be more common, and it may therefore be more important to implement policies
aimed at informing the public about surrogacy. As mentioned earlier, government entities could make
direct efforts to do so, or they could mandate that surrogacy intermediaries make certain efforts to
educate the public and dispel common misunderstandings. 555 Reducing stigma against surrogacy is
important not only to ease the emotional burdens of surrogacy, but also to ensure that surrogates and
other parties feel comfortable discussing the practice openly. Where surrogacy is taboo, it may discourage
public discourse about how best to improve the industry and prevent surrogates from reporting abuses
or accessing resources that could help them through the process.
In sum, while low levels of education do not preclude the possibility of rights-protective surrogacy
practices, surrogacy regulation should reflect the fact that they might exacerbate problems like lack of
informed consent, public misunderstanding, and surrogacy taboos that impede efforts to monitor and
improve the industry. Accordingly, regulation should often include measures to educate the public about
surrogacy and ensure that women fully understand all aspects of the process before agreeing to it.

5.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Women choose to become surrogates for various reasons: ideological motivations, a wish to provide
assistance to families struggling to conceive, a desire for an additional source of income, or a combination
of the three. Compensation may be particularly motivating in countries where women have limited
sources of income and available employment does not offer a living wage. In Cambodia, each of the three
surrogates interviewed sought an alternative source of income to garment work, in part to alleviate large
debts. 556 According to various sources, debt is a widespread problem throughout the country, as
individuals struggle to pay their basic expenses.557
Generally, financial need is not a reason to deprive a population of a possible source of employment.
However, economic need can make people vulnerable to many forms of exploitation, including human
trafficking and other forms of coerced labor. 558 In the surrogacy context, women may be drawn to
surrogacy to improve their financial situations, even where inadequate regulation exposes them to
exploitative intermediaries or unfair contract provisions. Thus, the economic conditions of a country and
the labor and employment context are important factors that should be reflected in surrogacy policy.
As with gender inequality, economic pressure is not unique to surrogacy but rather permeates society as
a whole. Also, while it may exacerbate some surrogacy-related concerns, it also means that surrogacy may
be particularly desirable as a form of economic empowerment. Where surrogacy is available to people in
difficult economic positions, regulations should reflect and address the risks arising from that economic
pressure. Minimum standards of health and safety should be established to ensure that women do not
subject themselves to extreme risks out of desperation. Additionally, certain forms of financial coercion
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should be prohibited, such as contract terms that could leave surrogates indebted to agencies if they
breach their agreements.
The economic imbalances present in a given country, or between surrogates in that country and intended
parent(s) from other countries, are also a factor to consider. Intended parent(s) and surrogacy
intermediaries are likely to be in a position of power compared to surrogates. This will likely serve as an
obstacle to redress when a surrogate’s rights are violated, as legal institutions may favor the interests of
other parties. In addition, the relative wealth of intended parent(s) may motivate intermediaries and
other actors to prioritize the intended parent(s)’s interests over the surrogates’ interests.559 In the context
of medical decisions, this could infringe on surrogates’ right to bodily autonomy. For example, Isabel Fulda
and Regina Tamés, advocate for reproductive rights in Mexico, describe a “common perception among
people who take part in surrogacy [in Mexico]…that women who sign such agreements give up their ability
to make decisions about their own bodies, including pregnancy termination and the conditions of
birth.”560 In cases where the surrogate’s health is in conflict with the child’s, this preferential treatment
of intended-parent(s) interests could even motivate intermediaries to make decisions that endanger
surrogates’ health. Fulda and Tamés report that they have reviewed contracts forbidding termination of
pregnancy even if the surrogate’s life were at risk.561
While such power balances do not necessarily prevent surrogacy from operating in a rights-promoting
manner, and could be alleviated by protective legislation, they could nonetheless aggravate other
potential problems. For instance, where no government or judicial body can be relied upon to effectively
enforce protective laws, surrogates may be at the mercy of intermediaries, which may be harmful where
intermediaries prioritize the interests of wealthier or more influential intended parent(s). Once again, the
most promising solution is strict protections, both substantive and procedural, that empower surrogates
and prevent other parties from taking advantage of surrogates in vulnerable positions.

6.

HISTORIC VIOLATIONS

Surrogacy has raised fears of various kinds of exploitation and other abuses. In some cases, similar
concerns have arisen with respect to other practices, such as intercountry adoption. These other practices
may provide some insight into the risks associated with surrogacy. For instance, where countries have
histories of child trafficking, this may indicate a greater risk that surrogacy could be utilized to traffic
children. In Guatemala, for instance, intercountry adoption was used to disguise the kidnapping or
coerced selling of children for profit.562 In light of this history, some scholars have raised concerns about
the growing surrogacy market in Guatemala.563 While surrogacy is different from intercountry adoption
in numerous ways, child trafficking is one of the most alarming risks of surrogacy, and may be difficult to
detect. Thus, any historical factors that indicate a country may be inadequately equipped to fully protect
children—or that existing criminal enterprises are likely to take advantage of any opportunity to illicitly
acquire children—should be carefully considered.
Similarly, a country might look to other industries and historical practices to determine whether various
risks—coercion of women, inadequate medical care, inadequate legal protection, or lack of informed
consent, for instance—are likely to be realized. In countries including Vietnam and Cambodia, for instance,
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women are sometimes sold by their families, or even kidnapped by strangers, to be given to foreign men
as brides.564 Where this is already occurring, it may be more likely that women could be similarly pressured
or forced into surrogacy. These sorts of existing problems, especially in analogous contexts, should guide
countries in determining the extent of various risks and the best way to respond to those risks. As with
other considerations discussed above, any increased risks should be reflected through stricter protective
policies, and specific risks should be addressed with appropriately tailored regulatory mechanisms.

C.

RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF SURROGACY’S TRANSNATIONALITY

Surrogacy is often a transnational enterprise where intended parent(s) engage surrogates from other
countries.565 This may be because surrogacy is illegal or prohibitively expensive in intended parent(s)’s
home countries, or because the process in other countries can provide better quality or a lower cost.566
This fact has important implications for a country’s regulatory approach. First, it suggests that countries
have a limited ability to control and regulate the surrogacy process unilaterally, which could counsel
against permitting surrogacy in some cases, or with some intended parent(s)’s countries. However, it also
means that countries have a limited ability to prevent surrogacy, as discussed above, which may indicate
that regulation is better than total prohibition or excessive restrictions. Finally, it also means that
surrogacy provides opportunities for international mechanisms to provide a degree of regulation:
countries with weaker infrastructure may be able to leverage international systems, or legal systems in
other countries, to promote effective regulation domestically.

1.

LIMITED CONTROL OF SURROGACY

Because surrogacy is often transnational, the country where surrogacy takes place may be limited in its
ability to regulate surrogacy. For instance, if intended parent(s) refuse to pay for the surrogacy, or attempt
to abandon the child, the country may not be able to hold them accountable. Furthermore, the country
may be limited in its ability to vet the intended parent(s) and ensure that they intend to provide the child
with a good life. Finally, the country will not have control over the rules regarding parentage and
citizenship in the intended parent(s)’s home country. If intended parent(s) attempt to bring the child back
to a country where surrogacy is prohibited—and indeed, such prohibitions in their home countries are
often the motivation for seeking surrogacy arrangements abroad—the child could be taken from them,
placed up for adoption, or left stateless.
Some of these problems could be addressed unilaterally. For instance, if intended parent(s) must place
money in escrow at the beginning of the surrogacy process, this money could be used to provide for the
surrogate’s expenses and compensation if the intended parent(s) attempt to break the agreement and
refuse to make all required payments. In addition, stricter screening of intended parent(s), including
background or credit checks, could help alleviate the risk that intended parent(s) will fail to fulfill their
obligations. Countries allowing surrogacy could also prohibit arrangements with intended parent(s) from
countries that may not recognize the child’s parentage and citizenship.
Another option to address some of the risks arising from transnational surrogacy arrangements is bilateral
or multilateral cooperation between countries. If intended parent(s) come from countries whose
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governments agree to hold them accountable for any wrongdoing, this could alleviate the risk of intended
parent(s) breaking surrogacy agreements. Intended parent(s)’s countries could also provide oversight to
ensure that the intended parent(s) are adequately caring for the children. Those countries could also take
some responsibility for vetting intended parent(s) in the first place, perhaps by providing helpful
information to corroborate their suitability. Finally, such countries could give assurances that children
born through surrogacy will be recognized, and will not be taken from the intended parent(s) or denied
citizenship. However, such cooperation may be difficult when intended parent(s) come from countries
where surrogacy is prohibited altogether. A country considering surrogacy regulations would therefore
have to consider (1) whether to allow surrogacy arrangements with intended parent(s) from countries
where surrogacy is prohibited, and (2) how to mitigate the risks of such arrangements if they do choose
to allow them. While the difficulty of holding intended parent(s) accountable might be surmountable, a
country permitting surrogacy probably cannot protect children from being orphaned or rendered stateless
without the cooperation of intended parent(s)’s countries.

2.

OPPORTUNITIES ARISING FROM TRANSNATIONAL STRUCTURE

In addition to the potential regulatory obstacles posed by transnational surrogacy, its transnational nature
also creates opportunities. The surrogacy industry depends on demand from intended parent(s), and
these intended parent(s) often come from wealthier countries with stronger infrastructures. As a result,
countries that tend to create surrogacy demand are well positioned to play a regulatory role, and might
be able to strengthen oversight of agencies operating in countries less able to monitor. For instance, a
surrogacy country might be able to impose a licensing system where government agents approve certain
agencies, but may be unable to enforce prohibitions on unlicensed operations. Intended parent(s)’s
countries could fill the gap by prohibiting surrogacy arrangements with unlicensed intermediaries.
Alternatively, an international body might oversee and approve certain surrogacy intermediaries, and
intended parent(s)’s countries might similarly legalize surrogacy with respect to approved agencies only.
This could provide a degree of protection without relying on the institutional capacity of the surrogacy
country. Even where such systems are not backed by legal sanctions, a licensing system such as these—
where only agencies that meet certain minimum standards are approved—would likely lead intended
parent(s) to agencies that better protect rights. Intended parent(s) would probably be glad to minimize
the risks of their surrogacy arrangement and know that it is legal and regulated. 567 At the very least,
international bodies could provide guidelines or model legislation to promote uniformity and cooperation
between states. International bodies have done this in areas bearing some similarity to surrogacy, such
as organ donation.568

VI.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Current trends in parenting, alternative family structures and women’s advancement in the workplace
suggest that demand for surrogacy will continue, and may expand in the coming decades. A thoughtful
approach to surrogacy and the rights and interests of all parties involved is needed. Among the many
rights implicated in surrogacy practices are: women’s reproductive freedom, bodily autonomy, and
privacy; the rights of children to protection from exploitation and to be raised in circumstances that meet
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their needs and best interests; and the right of individuals who are unable for reasons of infertility, sexual
orientation and otherwise to found a family without this form of reproductive assistance and to do so in
a manner that is free from discrimination.
This report has explored the various rights at issue in surrogacy along with practical barriers to their
protection and realization. As with any policy decision, there are various contexts and dynamics that make
a one-size-fits-all approach to surrogacy ill-advised. However, with the proper infrastructure and
regulations, surrogacy practices can take place in a manner that respects, and may even promote, the
human rights and interests of all parties.
The recommendations below focus on what authors understand as the fundamental policy decisions to
be made around surrogacy: whether to restrict or ban the practice; whether to allow for domestic or
transnational arrangements; whether to permit surrogates to receive compensation or require them to
provide the service altruistically; what role, if any, intermediary organizations should play in the process;
and how the human rights of surrogates and children can be further protected with specific regulatory
interventions. What follows does not provide a prescription for implementation but merely guidelines
and considerations in crafting a human rights-protective approach to the practice of surrogacy.
On general policy approaches, authors recommend consideration of the following:
 There is a significant lack of data and information available on existing surrogacy practices. In
particular, further research is needed to determine how, whether and under what circumstances
surrogacy arrangements are, in fact, serving as mechanisms for exploitation and abuse of
surrogates and/or children.
 Policy approaches to surrogacy should be based on the best-available scientific evidence, placed
within the larger context of an approach to infertility, reproduction and paths to parentage and
should respect, advance and protect the rights of stakeholders.
 State interests and obligations must be balanced in policy approaches to surrogacy. Primary
among these interests should be protecting individuals from abuse and exploitation, enabling
women’s bodily autonomy and reproductive decision-making and supporting the ability of
individuals and couples to found and expand their families.
 Regulations and policies on surrogacy should be developed in consultation with the various
stakeholders impacted, including surrogate women, intended parent(s), and, where possible,
individuals born through the surrogacy process.

A.

LEGALIZATION OF SURROGACY: BANS AND/OR RESTRICTIONS

The initial policy question for states is whether surrogacy should be severely restricted or banned. As
discussed above, in most if not all contexts, bans that prohibit surrogacy wholesale unduly infringe on
women’s rights to bodily autonomy and privacy as well as self-determination and, in the context of
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commercial surrogacy, potentially the freedom of choice of labor. Bans also compromise the ability of
individuals unable to reproduce due to infertility, sexual orientation or other circumstances to found
families. While these rights are not absolute, restrictions must be justified. Care should be taken to ensure
bans or severe limitations on surrogacy are not based on speculation or unverified fears of abuse or on
conditions of inequality and exploitation that are present more broadly outside the surrogacy context.
Nor should restrictions go beyond what is necessary to achieve legitimate ends. Finally, restrictions on
surrogacy should be considered in light of the benefits that surrogacy may promote, such as the
opportunity to found a family for infertile and LGBTQ+ individuals and couples.
This report has identified ways in which a country’s health and legal infrastructure can be critical to the
effective practice of surrogacy. However, the absence of a working infrastructure cannot, on its own,
justify a wholesale ban on surrogacy, just as an inadequate maternal health care system would not justify
severely restricting women’s ability to have children. The reality is that substandard conditions exist in
many countries in health care, education and government administration, conditions states are already
required to address as parties to various human rights treaties. Policy-makers must tread carefully in using
these limitations to justify restrictions on women’s right to make decisions around such personal and
private matters as whether to bear children, even when it is on behalf of another.
Bans may also increase the likelihood of unlawful or irregular surrogate arrangements, which could
endanger the rights of all parties, including children. In addition to the risks of illegal arrangements,
because surrogacy has become more transnational in nature, citizens of a country that bans surrogacy
may turn to opportunities in other states, where their rights as immigrants could be less protected.
Blanket bans on surrogacy have the potential to increase women and children’s vulnerability to human
rights violations.
In fact, wholesale bans on surrogacy, or laws restricting it to excessively narrow circumstances, are likely
to limit women’s rights impermissibly and beyond the extent necessary to protect surrogates or other
individuals. Moreover, such bans may simply push surrogacy into the brown or black market, or to
countries with less regulation, further exacerbating women and children’s vulnerability. Further, bans
often merely create greater burdens for intended parent(s) seeking to found families through surrogacy.
In particular, countries with significant demand for surrogacy that restrict surrogacy within their own
jurisdictions are often effectively compelling the expansion of a transnational market, as their own citizens
travel abroad by necessity or preference to seek such services. A recent estimate from the United
Kingdom, which restricts surrogacy to altruistic forms domestically, indicates that nearly half of intended
parent(s) based in the United Kingdom participated in transnational surrogacy. 569
On the issue of bans/significant restrictions of surrogacy, authors recommend consideration of the
following:
 Available evidence indicates that permanent wholesale bans on surrogacy are not justified by
concerns for human rights. Properly implemented regulatory mechanisms can address concerns
while enabling important human rights at stake for parties involved.
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 States have a duty under various treaty obligations to ensure access to basic health services,
including reproductive and maternal services, and to provide legal mechanisms for basic due
process and rule of law. Restrictions on surrogacy should not be justified by state failure to
comply with these obligations.
 If a state chooses to institute a ban or restriction, the ban should be temporary with a goal
towards developing mechanisms that will return this reproductive freedom to women and
assisted reproductive option to individuals wishing to have children.
 Bans should categorically avoid criminalizing surrogates for simply engaging in surrogacy.
 States that do institute bans must consider the best interests of the child, including the value to
the child of the relationship with the intended parent(s), when faced with unauthorized
surrogacy practices. Approaches to such cases should avoid separating children from intended
parent(s), rendering children stateless or requiring surrogates to raise children against their will.

B.

SCOPE OF SURROGACY: TRANSNATIONAL AND /OR DOMESTIC

Some countries have determined that surrogacy should be limited to agreements between domestic
parties. This, it is argued, allows the state greater supervision and regulation of the surrogate, intended
parent(s) and child. This report does not take a position on whether surrogacy should be domestic or
transnational but does find that certain considerations should be taken into account before surrogacy is
restricted domestically.
First, restricting surrogacy in this way, like prohibiting it altogether, limits opportunities for women
globally by preventing them from entering into economically beneficial transnational surrogacy
agreements. At the same time, limiting surrogacy to domestic arrangements limits intended parents(s)’s
access to surrogacy markets outside their own country, which might deprive them of the option altogether
if surrogacy is illegal for certain individuals or prohibitively expensive in their own countries. Prohibiting
transnational surrogacy might also create demand for unlawful surrogacy where the rights of women and
children would be entirely unprotected. Finally, these kinds of arrangements could motivate women in
countries without sufficient demand for surrogacy to travel to neighboring countries to be surrogates,
placing them in even more vulnerable circumstances subject to the laws and regulation of another
country. This has occurred in countries like Kenya, which has a low rule of law index and low enforcement
levels, as discussed above.
Undoubtedly, under the current circumstances, some of the risks associated with surrogacy are
exacerbated by transnational arrangements. For instance, it is more difficult to hold intermediaries and
intended parent(s) from other countries accountable, and it is more difficult to ensure children will be
granted full rights in the intended parent(s)’s home country. However, surrogacy will inevitably implicate
the laws of multiple countries, e.g. where a child born through surrogacy moves with her/his parents to a
new country.
63

Ultimately, rather than limit surrogacy to domestic arrangements, developing a transnational mechanism
that sets common standards, guidelines and potentially even monitors arrangements may be a better
option. To the extent, the concern is that intended parent(s) will “forum shop” for the most inexpensive
fees, indirectly creating incentives for intermediaries to solicit economically vulnerable women, a
mechanism or agreement on standardized surrogacy fees would better eliminate such incentives. A
transnational regulatory mechanism could set minimal terms of agreements, regulate costs and fees,
facilitate cooperation between states, ensure conformity in their laws, and mitigate risks that children will
be left stateless. An international or regional entity (e.g. European Union) could enact binding surrogacy
regulations or a treaty could be developed with an agreed-upon regulatory framework.
On the issue of whether surrogacy should be domestic or transnational, authors recommend
consideration of the following:
 A transnational mechanism may be the most effective and realistic way to meet the demand for
surrogacy services, address forum shopping concerns, establish international standards and
protect vulnerable surrogate women from exploitation.
 Domestic arrangements, while clearly benefitting from increased state capacity for oversight,
are unlikely to provide a long-term mechanism for surrogacy arrangements. A domestic
limitation, however, could be appropriate while a transnational mechanism is under
development.
 States that limit surrogacy to domestic arrangements must still contend with transnational
arrangements and how to protect the best interests of the child born through surrogacy. States
must develop policies and agreements to ensure children born through surrogacy are not
rendered stateless or in unrecognized parentage relationships.

C.

COMPENSATION: COMMERCIAL AND/OR ALTRUISTIC SURROGACY

The question of compensation for the service of surrogacy has proven to be controversial. As detailed
above, some countries have determined that surrogacy should be limited to altruistic surrogacy, requiring
that women who wish to serve as surrogates do so without receiving compensation. Some of the risks of
exploitation, it is argued, arise from surrogacy’s commercial nature. Women in economic need are
thought to be more likely to enter commercial surrogacy arrangements under exploitative circumstances.
In altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate recovers only expenses and, in some cases, lost wages. Altruistic
surrogacy regulations sometimes limit surrogacy to arrangements between close friends and family
members, where risk of exploitation may be further reduced.
It is possible altruistic surrogacy arrangements better protect against the potential for exploitation but
several considerations relevant to women’s human rights should be accounted for. First, altruistic
surrogacy limits an economic opportunity for women and requires them to engage in a service that only
women can provide that involves a significant amount of labor, risk, time and investment for no
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compensation. Second, women may be pressured by family dynamics to provide such a service
altruistically as many family structures continue to be organized around women’s disempowerment and
disproportionate responsibility for familial duties.
Moreover, the approach to surrogacy as only justified when done so altruistically may inadvertently
undermine women’s equality by continuing a historical undervaluation of labor unique to women. In
particular, the view that surrogacy, because it involves the pregnancy and birthing of a child, should by its
nature not be compensated, should be questioned for its reliance on conceptions of maternity,
motherhood and women’s labor that may be based in harmful stereotypes of women’s role in society.
Determining that surrogacy cannot be compensated may have the effect of disempowering women,
devaluing their work, and reinforcing the idea that women’s labor should not be treated as economically
valuable. As discussed above, historically, numerous activities have been excluded from our conceptions
of “labor” for a variety of reasons, often rooted in social stereotypes and inequalities.
Second, altruistic surrogacy limits the ability of intended parent(s) to engage a surrogacy service, as there
is likely to be a more limited pool of women willing to perform this service with no compensation. In fact,
countries that limit surrogacy to altruistic practices but are also source countries for high numbers of
intended parent(s) may merely be compelling the creation of a commercial transnational market. As
mentioned above, a recent study by the Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law
Commission estimates that approximately half of surrogacy arrangements entered into by UK-based
parents, are transnational. 570 As domestic surrogacy in the UK is limited to altruistic surrogacy
arrangements, it is highly likely these transnational arrangements are commercial and a function of an
unmet demand by the altruistic limitations (or alternatively lower costs involved in transnational
arrangements vs. altruistic arrangements based in the UK). Regardless, it is possible that altruistic
surrogacy limitations could, like bans or restrictions, simply support the growth of commercial industry
elsewhere, whether that industry be illicit or sanctioned. This simply redirects the burden of protecting
surrogates involved in commercial surrogacy onto another state.
Moreover, the central question is whether limiting surrogacy in this manner is justified by the benefits it
provides despite the rights it restricts. Depriving women of an economic opportunity because protections
against exploitation are not in place may unfairly burden women with the shortcomings of a state’s
economic, legal and social infrastructure. Unregulated employment sectors such as garment work,
domestic work and farm work are rife with exploitation for the same reasons in many countries –
insufficient regulation and ineffective monitoring and accountability mechanisms by the state. Rather
than eliminate a form of work or profit, states should work to create environments that are safe for
women to work in.
On the issue of whether surrogates should be compensated or surrogacy limited to altruistic forms,
authors recommend consideration of the following:
 Altruistic surrogacy limitations in high demand states may merely encourage expansion of
commercial markets elsewhere, relieving certain states of regulatory burdens but increasing the
burden on other states.
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 Altruistic surrogacy limitations may encourage “creative” agreements between the surrogate
and intended parent(s) to identify a mechanism for compensation, making enforcement of
agreements more difficult and legal protections less effective.
 Altruistic surrogacy limitations may be based on gender discrimination and stereotyping of
maternal labor or other paternalistic assumptions about monetization of women’s labor.
 Surrogacy services are demanding labor which potentially carry long term physical
consequences to the surrogate. Fairness may dictate that compensation for such a service is
appropriate.
 Altruistic surrogacy limitations may burden women and result in surrogates being pressured by
family or social inequalities to provide this service with little benefit.

D.

REGULATORY PROTECTIONS: INTERMEDIARIES, SURROGATES, CHILDREN AND
INTENDED PARENT (S)
1.

INTERMEDIARIES

Many of the concerns around exploitation in the surrogacy process can be addressed by increased
regulation and standard setting of intermediaries, the organizations which service and connect the
surrogates and intended parent(s), sometimes supervising the medical process and often the surrogate’s
pregnancy and birth. Currently, such organizations operate with little oversight or regulation. This is an
increasingly lucrative industry that often charges more in fees than those collected by the surrogate
women. Depending on the context, intermediaries can exercise significant control over the surrogates,
including arranging housing, board and medical care. Where no government regulation or intervention
exists, surrogates can find themselves in vulnerable positions in relation to the intermediary organization.
In fact, surrogacy agencies have been responsible for most reported misconduct and human rights abuses
in the past: cheating intended parent(s) and predatory behavior toward potential surrogates, including
the making of false monetary promises, enlisting women as surrogates without providing them with a
contract or substantial information about the procedures, restraining the physical freedom of surrogates,
and using psychological and emotional affirmations to reduce surrogate’s bargaining power for pay.571
They also, however, can play an important role in connecting parties, structuring and monitoring their
relationship to ensure the best possible outcome for all.572
Currently, a number of countries have placed restrictions on the role or existence of surrogacy
intermediaries. South Africa, which only allows for altruistic surrogacy, has forbidden advertisement of
surrogacy services. 573 The United Kingdom, which similarly allows only altruistic surrogacy, forbids
commercial agencies but explicitly allows non-profits to play the role of intermediaries.574 In New Zealand,
which similarly limits surrogacy to its altruistic form, also prohibits commercial agencies and advertising.575
Following these examples, allowing only non-profits to operate as surrogacy intermediaries might
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constitute a way of limiting risks of abuse by commercial agencies and potentially ensuring the fees
charged go primarily to the surrogate.576
Other solutions can be found to preserve the intermediaries’ role in the process while protecting human
rights. One possible solution is to require that private surrogacy agencies obtain licenses and to condition
the maintenance of this license upon the respect of certain conditions and standards of conduct. States
could, for example, impose ethical requirements on surrogacy agencies such as imposing mandatory
reporting of any misconduct they observe, a regulation common to the medical and legal professions. A
licensing regime should aim to promote and facilitate transparency between the parties particularly on
issues of: decisions intended parent(s) can and cannot make about the pregnancy; what medical and
psychological services the surrogate is entitled to; and the obligations of the intended parent(s) toward
the resulting child.577 Such mechanisms would allow the government to retain ultimate control over the
surrogacy process while relying on the private market to provide coordinating services. A recent report
from the United Kingdom, for example, recommends regulation of surrogacy agencies by the government
authority on human fertilization. 578
Another solution, as discussed above, would be to develop a transnational mechanism that replaces
private agencies by fulfilling a similar coordinating function. Such a body might be more transparent and
accountable than private actors for its actions. The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) provides a
useful point of reference. UNOS is a private non-profit that manages the national organ transplant system
in the United States under contract with the federal government. 579 This organization manages the
national transplant waiting list and matches donors and recipients, keeps a record of every transplant that
takes place in the US, provides assistance to patients, serves as a framework to develop policies, and
educates stakeholders and the public about organ donations and transplants.580 A similar body could be
created in the context of surrogacy. That body could screen and match parties, provide them with a
framework to reach an agreement that meets all legal conditions, validate the agreement once reached,
and assist in its implementation.
To better ensure intermediaries contribute to human rights-compliant surrogacy practices, authors
recommend consideration of the following:
 Surrogacy intermediary organizations should be regulated at the state and international level,
including strict licensing requirements, defined duties and responsibilities and accountability
and reporting mechanisms.
 It may be advisable to limit the role of private for-profit surrogacy intermediaries to matching
and facilitating arrangements. Instances of intermediaries controlling all aspects of the process
are concerning to the extent vulnerable surrogates are subject to uneven standards and
practices in an unregulated industry.
 States should consider development of a government apparatus that either serves as a
surrogacy intermediary and/or collects data on surrogacy services and monitors the activities
of these private organizations.
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 The global community should consider developing a transnational mechanism that replaces
private agencies and fulfils a coordinating and monitoring function.

2.

SURROGATES

Various policies and regulations would protect women in the surrogacy process, ensuring voluntariness
and informed consent; safeguarding reproductive rights and adequate access to health care; and ensuring
fair contract terms and favorable working conditions.
a)
E NSURING W OMEN ’ S C HOICE AND I NFORMED C ONSENT
Any woman who chooses to participate in surrogacy must do so voluntarily and with full knowledge of
the process. The requirement of informed consent protects women’s right to make decisions about their
bodies and reproductive choices, and guards against any undue pressure, coercion and deception.
Women’s consent must be voluntary and informed as to every aspect of the process, including the
decision to become pregnant, the conditions of the pregnancy (e.g., medical interventions and any
restrictions on the surrogate’s activities) and the process of birthing and post-natal medical care. Policies
that would strengthen women’s ability to provide informed consent include: a mandatory written
agreement between the parties in a language understood by surrogate; regulations that determine the
format and content of information provided to surrogate about the surrogacy process and implications;
the provision of free independent counsel or advisor throughout the process to the surrogate 582 ;
mechanisms that ensure terms of surrogacy agreements are enforceable; and an independent body that
is available to the surrogate for consultation, information and monitoring.
b)
A DEQUATE S TANDARDS OF M EDICAL C ARE
The surrogacy process must be conducted in a manner that meets best practices in the field of
reproductive medicine. It must be conducted by licensed medical professionals with adequate resources
and facilities. Surrogate women must receive the necessary medical care prior, during and for a
reasonable period of time after the pregnancy. Financial limitations or interference by third parties
(whether it be intermediaries, intended parent(s) or others) can limit women’s access to adequate health
care. If the state in which surrogacy is taking place does not have the infrastructure for such medical care,
regulations on surrogacy should ensure an alternate form of private care is provided to surrogates.
c)
E NFORCEABLE A GREEMENTS AND A CCOUNTABILITY M ECHANISMS
Surrogacy arrangements must be governed by contractual commitments, the minimal terms of which,
must be set in law and enforceable through an effective and accessible mechanism. The state or
transnational body should define minimal fair terms and provide adequate administrative and judicial
mechanisms for their enforcement. In certain contexts, the contractual terms may be the only explicit
provisions governing the parties’ interactions and should, therefore, be aimed at protecting all parties. To
best ensure fair terms, surrogates should be assisted or represented by legal counsel or an advisor,
independent of the intermediary or intended parent(s).583
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Contract terms must be reviewed to ensure they do not violate women’s reproductive freedoms, freedom
of movement or any other rights. Terms cannot, for example, compel a woman to terminate a pregnancy
or to undergo a medical procedure involuntarily. They also cannot encroach on surrogates’ freedom of
movement by placing restrictions that are unreasonable or unnecessary to protect the health of the child.
Contracts should be designed to provide protections to the surrogate against non-performance and nonpayment. Where commercial surrogacy is legal, terms of the contract should ensure that women will be
compensated for their labor at a fair rate, including where the process results in an unsuccessful
pregnancy. Where there is risk of non-performance, states should consider requiring intended parent(s)
to place an amount of money sufficient to cover the process in escrow in advance.
d)
F AVORABLE C ONDITIONS OF S URROGACY
Surrogates are entitled to favorable conditions during the surrogacy process, regardless of whether they
are providing the service for commercial or altruistic reasons. Whether or not a state designates surrogacy
as “work” or “labor”, the conditions of surrogacy should be regulated, especially because the labor of
surrogacy involves a commitment to the process for a fixed term. Conditions defined by regulations could
include compensation mechanisms, benefits, and a protected right to unionize.
To ensure surrogates’ human rights are protected throughout the surrogacy process, authors
recommend consideration of the following:
 Surrogates should be provided with adequate reproductive and maternal health care
throughout the process, including during implantation, pregnancy and for a reasonable period
of time following conclusion of the pregnancy. If the state cannot provide adequate care via a
public health care system, an alternative private system may be employed, at no cost to the
surrogate, as long as such a system is subject to regulation and monitoring.
 The informed consent of the surrogate at every stage of the surrogacy process, including all
medical procedures and services, is critical to any surrogacy practice. Regulations should
determine the format and content of information provided to surrogate about the surrogacy
process and implications. The surrogate should receive independent advice and counsel on the
process and the terms of any agreements.
 The state should require written agreements with minimal terms that are enforceable through
an accessible administrative and/or legal mechanism. The terms of written agreements may
not unduly infringe on the surrogate’s bodily autonomy, freedom of movement or privacy.
 In the commercial context, measures should be put in place to ensure surrogates receive the
appropriate support and compensation. States could require, for example, that intended
parent(s) put the cost of the surrogacy process in escrow in advance of the initiation of the
process.
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3.

CHILDREN

The welfare of children born through surrogacy should be a primary concern of any surrogacy mechanism.
Children’s rights to be protected from exploitation and abuse, to have their best interest taken into
account as primary consideration in all decisions involving them, and to have an identity, including legal
parentage and citizenship, are all implicated in the practice of surrogacy.
a)
P ROTECTION FROM E XPLOITATION AND A BUSE
States have a duty under international law to protect children from exploitation and abuse. To prevent
such abuses, states should put in place a mechanism to insure intended parent(s) are willing and able to
care for the resulting child. For example, certain existing regulations require that intended parent(s) meet
the same standards of fitness that are required for adoptions domestically. 584 Pre-conception fitness
determinations are advisable and should be made with regulatory guidance. Fitness determinations
should not perpetuate stereotypes or discriminate against same-sex couples or single parents. States
should not presume that the risk of exploitation solely arises from intended parent(s). In certain
circumstances, as discussed above, the risks to children may be most acute from unscrupulous
intermediaries, or from policies that interfere with the relationship between the child and intended
parent(s).
b)
B EST I NTERESTS OF THE C HILD
The best interests of the child should guide all policies and mechanisms impacting children. As a
consequence, even where a state bans surrogacy, the state should provide some mechanism for children
born through surrogacy and intended parent(s) to remain together if that is in the best interest of the
child. Children should not be discriminated against based on the conditions of their birth. Decisions about
the best interest of the child in the surrogacy context should not be based on preconceived assumptions
about the intended parent(s) and the practice of surrogacy but on a close examination of the best
environment for the child to develop her or his full potential.
Careful review of surrogacy practices and policies should be made to determine how best to support
children born through surrogacy. Important questions include whether the child should be able to access
information about her or his genetic origins and heritage at a certain age.
c)
R IGHT TO P ARENTAGE AND C ITIZENSHIP
No child born through surrogacy should be left stateless or have their right to identity, parentage and
citizenship violated by state laws or the incompatibility of different states’ laws on surrogacy and
parentage. States must protect children’s right to an identity, including legal parentage and citizenship.
States must therefore recognize the legal relationship between the child and the intended parent(s) and
grant citizenship to the child born to a surrogate abroad if that is in the child’s best interest as determined
above. States should avoid interference with child-parent relationship formed through surrogacy where
there is no evidence of exploitation or abuse.
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To protect rights of children born from surrogacy, authors recommend consideration of the following:
 Surrogacy policy and regulations must ensure children born of surrogacy arrangements are
protected from abuse and exploitation as well as raised in conditions that serve their best
interests. Towards this end, pre-conception fitness determinations of the surrogate and
intended parent(s) should be made. Regulation of intermediary organizations should also aim
to protect the children born of surrogacy in addition to surrogate women and intended
parent(s).
 Policies should also consider the particular needs of children born through surrogacy. For
example, policies may allow children to access information about their genetic and gestational
origin at a certain age.
 State policies on surrogacy should not deprive children of an identity, parentage, citizenship or
leave children stateless. In fact, states should avoid interference with the parent-child
relationship, even where surrogacy practices were not sanctioned.

4.

INTENDED PARENT (S)

Intended parent(s) have also been impacted by the lack of regulation and standards in the surrogacy
industry. Intended parent(s) have been victims of fraud and misrepresentation by intermediary
organizations. In some cases, such as in Cambodia, intended parent(s) have been denied parentage of
their children birthed through the surrogacy process. Intended parent(s)’ right to found a family and to
do so without discrimination is implicated in policy decisions around surrogacy.
Childbearing through surrogacy is an important advancement in assisted reproduction for individuals
unable to procreate through traditional means. Access to surrogacy has become an important path for
same-sex couples to exercise their reproductive rights and found families. Similarly, older couples
suffering from infertility and single parents are increasingly benefitting from surrogacy practices. In this
context, surrogacy can enable enjoyment of the basic right to found a family for many previously unable
to do so.
To protect the rights of intended parent(s) in the surrogacy process, authors recommend consideration
of the following:
 States should approach regulation of surrogacy practices in the context of efforts to address
infertility and facilitate access to the benefits of assisted reproductive technologies. These
technologies facilitate the founding and expansion of families in its various forms.
 States should adopt policies that enable transfer of parentage and citizenship for children born
of surrogacy. State should prioritize avoiding interference in the relationship between a fit
parent and child, especially when such interference will result in the child being placed in state
care or raised, under compulsion, by an unwilling surrogate.
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 States should enact regulations and monitoring mechanisms that assist intended parent(s) to
identify intermediary organizations that will engage in surrogacy practices in a lawful and
human rights-compliant manner.
 Fitness determinations of intended parent(s) should not perpetuate stereotypes or discriminate
against same-sex couples or single parents.
 States should not presume that the risk of exploitation of children arises from intended parent(s)
without evidence to support this presumption. Concerns about human trafficking and organ
selling in surrogacy appear to be largely speculative at this stage and can lead to harsh policies
that negatively impact well-meaning intended parent(s).
A great deal is at stake in how the global community and state governments approach this emerging and
now growing practice. For intended parent(s), it is the right to have a family that may be imperiled or
taken away; for surrogate women it is the chance to earn a decent wage while providing a much needed
service; for children born through surrogacy, it is the right to be protected and the right to citizenship and
an identity; and for states, it is their ability to guarantee the safety and health of their people. Surrogacy
ought to be regulated to prevent human rights abuses that can and have occurred, but the practice should
not be banned. A human rights protective and promoting approach must work toward protecting the
rights of all, striking the right balance through well informed and measured laws and policies.
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